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This Article engages with some of the ke debates that have emerged among
international Iaw and civil procedure scholars by examining the flurny of recent
transnational cases that have become a common feature on the U.S. Supreme Court's
docket. It makes three principal contributions. First, it explains how the recent decisions
involving persona!jurisdiction should be understood within, and partyl limited to, their
irztncuatioa/ covtexts. Disputes in o/vg non-resident foreign defendants raise different
considerations than those invo/vg defendants in the United States, and this Article
canvasses those differences. Ira concern previousy was that courts gave too short shrift to
the international aspects of a case, the concern now is that lower courts may make the
reverse mistake by overstating the applicability of recent deasions to the domestic, interstate
context. Second, it details how international /aw imposes modest constraints on national
court adjudicatoy authority, and pushes back on recent attempts to reimagine public
international /aw. It shows how the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States-which asserts thatpersona/jurisdiction in dvil cases is unregu/ated
under international /aw -advances a position inconsistent with the overwhelming weight
of authority. The Restatement's attempt to fashion new customay /aw and reshape the
existing /egal regime in the persona/jurisdiction arena is problematic, and this Article
serves as a countetpoint to that effort. Third, it describes an interpa between uni/atera!
domestic extraterritorial regulation and international lawmaking, and aligns personaljurisdiction with the closel-related area of /egislative jurisdiction. Costraints on broad
jurisdictional assertions in transnational disputes may be one of the predicates necessay to
spur U.S. multilateral engagement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following a more-than-twenty year hiatus, personal jurisdiction cases1
are again front and center on the U.S. Supreme Court's docket.2 Over the
last eight years, the Court has clarified the jurisdictional landscape directly
on six occasions. 3 Partly the decisions have reimagined doctrine, but at the
same time they have also reaffirmed long-standing principles. 4 Strikingly,
many of the cases have transnational elements. 5 The number of
transnational decisions is even greater if one includes those decided in the
related, but distinct, area of legislative jurisdiction.6 The Court's appetite for
hearing cases with foreign conduct involving non-citizens in U.S. civil
litigation appears, at least for the time being, unwaning.
1. Personal jurisdiction, also referred to as judicial or adjudicatory jurisdiction, is the power of
the courts to subject particular persons, things, or entities to judicial process. CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1351, 239-61 (1992). Legislative
jurisdiction, in contrast, is the authority of a nation to make laws applicable to persons or conduct.
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 8 (2009), avaz/able atibanet.org. And executive jurisdiction is sometimes used to refer to
the executive branch's authority to enforce laws. Id.
2. Before 2011, the last personal jurisdiction case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). A similar twenty-year hiatus existed before the
Supreme Court's landmark decisions in the 1980s. When the Supreme Court decided Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and the series of cases that followed, it reentered an area that had laid
dormant since Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
3. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 134
S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017);
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
4. A number of commentators have noted the changes, and are usually critical of them. For some
of the most recent, see, e.g., Aaron D. Simowitz, Le gisainag Tran sationalJusdction, 57 VA. J. INT'L L.
325 (2018) (arguing that "the Supreme Court has, in the past few years, turned the United States into
one of the most jurisdictionally stingy countries in the world."); Scott Dods on, Personal Jusikction in the
Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 76 (2018) (describing the narrowing of jurisdiction and how
since 2011 the Court's jurisprudence has taken a "restrictive turn"); Michael Hoftheimer, The Stealth
Revolution in PersonalJunsckction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 505 (2018) (describingnew restrictions on personal
jurisdiction and arguing that the Supreme Court "is implementing radical law reform"); William
Grayson Lambert, The Necessary Narrowing of Personal Juns-ction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 375, 427 (2016)
(describing "a revolution in personal jurisdiction").
5. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2780 (lawsuit against a British manufacturer of a recycling machine used
to cut metal); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915 (families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash
in France involving allegedly faulty tires made in Turkey, sued Goodyear subsidiaries located in Turkey,
France, and Luxembourg); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746 (workers and relatives of a manufacturing plant
in Argentina sued a German company and its subsidiaries for human rights violations).
6. For recent decisions, seeJesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); RJR Nabisco, Inc.
v. European Community, 36 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108
(2013); Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). The Supreme Court decided these cases
"after a decades-long increase in the volume of cases brought under statutes with potentially
extraterritorial effects." Racketeer Inluenced and Corrupt OQganiations Act Extraterntonali RJR
Nabisco, Ic. v. European Union, 130 HARV. L. REv. 487, 487 (2016) (citing Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiminag
,ternationa lLaw from Extraterton.aio, 93 MINN. L. REv. 815, 818 (2009)).
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As the Supreme Court has shown its willingness to engage with
jurisdiction doctrines anew, 7 old debates among legal academics and
practitioners have reemerged. At the forefront is a now-familiar one: the
nature of the limits on jurisdiction and whether they serve primarily to
allocate sovereign power or to protect individual liberty.8 Less thoroughly
examined are the decision's international or transnational aspects. With the
notable exception of a flurry of recent scholarship, 9 personal jurisdiction
cases are rarely situated within the Court's international and foreign affairs
jurisprudence. 10 That's unfortunate. Divorcing the Court's most recent
decisions from their international contexts risks lower courts overstating
their relevance to purely domestic disputes and misinterpreting them. Also,
the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence involving international
disputes does not live in a vacuum. Instead, it is one of the doctrinal plains
upon which broader and more salient debates related to global governance,
international law, and sovereign authority are waged. 11 Recognizing the
differences between transnational and domestic cases, and appreciating the
stakes involved, helps one to better understand the Court's decisions and
their limits.
This Article examines personal jurisdiction jurisprudence involving
foreign, nonresident defendants while advancing three core themes. First,
commentators and courts still tend to treat international cases as simple
extensions of domestic disputes, with little thought to how the
7. For a description of the Court's reengagement with civil procedure issues more broadly, see
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civtil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313 (2012).
8. See, eg., George Ruthergien, Personal Junsdicon and Political Authorty, 32 J. LAW & POL. 1, 1
(2016) (describing "a deeper, more abstract problem, over the nature of the limits on jurisdiction: do
those limits serve primarily to allocate power between sovereign states-by reference to contacts and
territory-or do they protect individual rights-by reference to fairness?"); Alan M. Trammel & Derek
E. Bambauer, Personal Jun s-ction and the "Interwebs", 100 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1152-57 (2015)
(describing principles underlying personal jurisdiction, including fairness and state sovereignty).
9. See, e.g, Simowitz, supra note 4; Robin Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in
PersonalJun s-ction, 116 MICH. L. REv. ONLINE 123 (2018); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal
Juscftion and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018); Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The
Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws Two Suggestionsfor the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws- Personal
juisdiction Over Foreign Defendants and Part Autonomy in International Contracts, 27 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L
L. 391 (2017); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, A Shifting Equiibrium:
Personal Jun s-ction, Transnationalbitizgation, and the Problem of Nonpares, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643
(2015); Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization The Case of Transational Personal
Judction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2013).
10. For a discussion over a decade ago of this oversight and the relevant literature, see Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignp, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident, Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1 (2006).
11. George Rutherglen recently has made a similar observation. Rutherglen, supra note 8, at 6
("[P]ersonal jurisdiction cannot be considered as an esoteric specialty, divorced from the broad trends
in legal theory, constitutional law, international human rights, and international trade ... [and that it]
remains central to the ever more salient and pressing questions that have arisen over the scope of
national sovereignty.").
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circumstances are different.12 That tendency is problematic and is likely to
continue to occur if courts are not mindful. It has also caused practical and
conceptual difficulties with the way personal jurisdiction doctrine has
developed. Second, territorial sovereignty considerations appropriately play
a more significant role in international cases than in domestic ones. The
restraints on national power in the international system serve related, but
different, ends than the restraints, if any, imposed by horizontal federalism.
While in the domestic context, the Court has drawn both on individual
liberty and sovereignty considerations in interpreting the Due Process
Clause, public international law's constraints are all about the sovereign
limits on state power. In this way, legislative and personal jurisdiction
doctrine for transnational cases are more twinned to one another than they
are to their domestic counterparts. Third, the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions should remain tethered to their international moorings. If a
concern previously was that courts gave too short shrift to the international
aspects of a case, the concern now is that lower courts may make the reverse
mistake by overstating the applicability of recent decisions to the purely
domestic context. 13
The article also contributes to some of the more critical prevailing
debates among international law scholars. Expanding on a position
advanced in prior work, it describes an interplay between jurisdictional
doctrines and international law, and how aggressive extraterritorial national
law has the potential to undermine international lawmaking. 14 In this way, it
breaks with scholars who view the recent decisions curtailing the broadest
assertions of jurisdiction as isolationist or necessarily indicative of the Court
turning inward.15 It also critiques recent attempts to remake international
12. Parrish, Sovereitn, Not Due Process, supra note 10, at 4-5; Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 9
(exploring difference between domestic and transnational cases).
13. Katherine Florey has recently made a similar point, but justified on different grounds,
principally focused on choice-of-law considerations. Katherine Florey, WhatPersonalJuri-ction Doctrine
Does-And What It Should Do, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (2016) ("The Court cannot have it
both ways; if a more stringent standard for foreign defendants is appropriate because of the special
burdens they face, then the personal jurisdiction standard should be more lenient for domestic
defendants."); id. at 1249 ("The second risk is that courts will heedlessly apply principles forged in
cases involving foreign defendants to domestic defendants as well, thus providing them redundant
protection they do not need and depriving plaintiffs of the chance to be heard.").
14. Most recently, see Austen L. Parrish, The Intae between Extrater toriali, So ereg..n, and the
Foundations of International Law, in STANDARDS AND SOVEREIGNS: LEGAL HISTORIES OF
EXTRATERRITORIALITY (Routledge 2019); see also Austen L. Parrish, Reclamiag Intenational Law from
Extraterrito-alip', 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009).
15. See, eg., Pamela K. Bookman, Utizgation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015); cf. Maggie
Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 944 n.1 (2017) listing commentary which worries
that "U.S. courts are shirking cases that involve foreign litigants, foreign laws, or foreign harms"). For
a lecture that critiques this view, see Austen L. Parrish, Faznhg Extraterritonalio and Isolationism?
Developments in the United States, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2017).
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law through suggestions that a court's adjudicatory jurisdiction is
unregulated.16 International law imposes modest constraints on personal
jurisdiction, and appropriately so. 17 A reimagining of international law that
permits, without any limit, one nation's courts to unilaterally claim authority
over the citizens of another would be to return to an approach more akin to
the empire-building of colonial times: an approach that modern
international law sought to inter.
This Article has five parts, beginning with this introduction and ending
with a conclusion. Part II sets out, in summary fashion, why personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants remains a timely issue with important
implications and worthy of analysis. It also shows how personal jurisdiction
doctrine can impact international lawmaking. Part III describes the current
state of the doctrine as it relates to international litigation in U.S. courts. It
proposes that the leading personal jurisdiction cases in the 1970s and 1980s
are best understood as "national" cases, where the Court grappled with a
growing national economy, evolving notions of federalism, and particular
social and political changes. At the time, the case's international dimensions,
when they appeared, were often ignored or downplayed.18 In contrast, the
Court's most recent forays into personal jurisdiction-while also influenced
by a particular vision of American horizontal federalism as well as some of
the Justices' inclinations to cabin the role of private rights litigation-can be
understood, in part, as the Court grappling with the case's transnational
dimensions. While the recent decisions remain often fractured, they respond
more to the realities of globalization and implicitly reaffirm, in modest ways,
foundational principles of public international law.
Part IV begins by identifying international law's limits on adjudicatory
jurisdiction. The Article explains why the American Law Institute's recent
Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
attempts to reshape the existing legal regime when it states that international
law no longer constrains personal jurisdiction. The Fourth Restatement's
new approach is against the great weight of authority and is problematic for
those concerned with protecting individuals from overreaching state power.
Part IV then explores other differences between international and domestic
cases. It concludes that these differences are meaningful and that the latest
decisions are less a a break from the past if the decisions are kept to their
international contexts.1 9 This does not mean the decisions are free from
16. See infra section IV.A.ii.
17. See inra section IV.A.i; notes 170-96.
18. Seegenera//y Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfirfor Globetroting 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027,
1037-38 (1995) (describing how the Court now "tends to treat tramsnational cases as if they were
interstate in nature").
19. Cf LindaJ. Silbermm, The End ofAnotheriEra. Ref/ections on Daim/er and lts Implicationsfor Personal
Junshtion in the UnitedStates, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 677-81 (2015).
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criticism. But on the margins, the withdrawal from some of the broadest
assertions of jurisdiction over foreign, nonresident defendants may help
provide the breathing space from aggressive unilateral regulation that may
serve as a necessary predicate for international lawmaking. While often
under-appreciated, constraining exorbitant jurisdictional assertions can play
a role in creating an environment where consensual multilateral-as
opposed to unilateral approaches to transnational issues are possible.
II. THE WORLD IN ALL OUR COURTS 0
The number of transnational cases involving noncitizen, nonresident
defendants are substantial, both inside and outside the United States, and
the cases have important access to justice implications. The scope of a
court's adjudicatory jurisdiction is not simply a where-to-sue doctrinal
question. Rather, it raises the question whether certain kinds of global
challenges should primarily be resolved at the national or international level,
and whether the process of transnational dispute resolution should be
mostly unilateral or mostly collaborative.
A. The Growth of Transnational Litigation
Cases in U.S. courts with transnational or international dimensions are
increasingly prevalent, and have been for some time.2 1 This isn't news,
especially so in the personal jurisdiction context. Part of the cause for the
trend is globalization: as travel, business, trade, and commerce across
borders have become common, so too have cross-border disputes. 22
20. Stephen B. Burbank, The Worldin Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1991) (reviewing GARY
B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
(1989)). Since Prof. Burbank wrote his review, transnational litigation has expanded significantly
outside the U.S. too. See infra notes 36-40.
21. Bookman, supra note 15, at 1083-84 ("Transnational suits-cases involving foreign parties,
foreign conduct, foreign law, and foreign effects-and the law that governs them have growing
significanLce in the United States and around the world."); Dodge & Dodson, supra note 9, at 1206
("Litigation in the United States is increasingly international" and describing "[t]he increasing
prevalence of noncitizens in U.S. civil litigation."). This has long been a recognized trend. Burbank,
supranote 20, at 1456 (describing the increased practical importance ofinternational litigation); Ronan
E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Juns-ction Over and Enforcement of judgments Against Alien
Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799-800 (1988) ("It is trite but true to observe [that transnational
litigation] is increasingly steadily and doubtless will continue to do so."); Graham C. Lilly, Junsction
Over Domestic and Alien Defendansf 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 116 (1983) ("The flourishing activity of
international commerce has resulted in increased numbers of claims against alien defendants brought
in American courts.").
22. See, e.g, Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an Internationa l uial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 432
(2003) (describing the growth of transnational litigation as a result of the intemet and increased cross-
border activity).
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Changes in technology, including the expansion of the internet, have meant
localized conduct can have far-reaching impact. 23 The "growth of
multinational corporations doing business across borders and on a global
scale . . . the globalization of banking and stock exchanges . . . and the
emergence of transnational criminal enterprises and activities have
combined to encourage states" to broaden their jurisdictional reaches.2 4
Third parties financing transnational litigation may also play a role.2 5
The trend is also partly attributed to the U.S. reluctance to enter into
international agreements for reciprocal court access or to create
international regulatory mechanisms. 2 6 This reluctance has rendered private
rights litigation in domestic courts under national law as sometimes the only
avenue for seeking redress. 27 U.S. courts also have become attractive forums
for litigants when their home nation's judicial system is ill-equipped or
insufficiently developed to handle complex regulatory claims.2 8
American lawyers have become more comfortable with transnational
cases too, which may have also contributed to the growth.29 Law schools
now commonly teach the subject,30 a wide-range of institutes, centers and
23. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD 179-83 (2006). On the broader topic, see Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick
Globalism: Sovereignp in the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (2004).
24. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, at 5.
25 Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational etizgadon, 44
CASE W. R.ES. J. INT'L L. 159 (2001) (describing the rise of this phenomenon).
26. Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality, and U.S. Predominance in International
Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 156
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (describing the U.S. shift away from international law to
using national law as a tool of foreign policy). For reciprocal court access, see Transboundary Pollution
Reciprocal Access Act, R.S.O. ch. T.18 (1990) (Cm.) (providing reciprocal court access to victims of
traisboundary pollution).
27. Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011)
(questioning the litigation explosion narrative in the U.S.).
28. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaint -fs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against "Judcial
Imperialism," 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 696-98 (2016) (systematically analyzing when foreign
sovereigns initiate lawsuits in the U.S.).
29. THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION AND THE NALP FOUNDATION FOR LAW CAREER
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, AFTER THEJD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF
LEGAL CAREERS 35 (2009) (indicating that nearly half of U.S. lawyers are called upon to solve
transnational legal problems for their clients, with almost two-thirds of lawyers at large law firms and
serving as inside counsel report an international component to their practices); see also DONALD E.
CHILDRESS III ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2015) (describing the increase in
transnational practice)
30. Transnational law is now taught in law schools as a separate course from international law.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Wh' and How to Study "Transnational" Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97, 100
(2011); see also Helen Hershkoff, Integrating TransnationalLegal Perspectives into the First Year Civil Procedure
Curriculum, 56J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 479 (2006) (noting "the move to globalize the curriculum at other
law schools has gathered steam, fueled by conferences, symposia, and workshops . . . with current
efforts aimed at ensuring 'that the vast majority, if not all, of law school graduates have exposure to
issues of international, transnational, and comparative law.") (quotes omitted); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 745, 751-52 (2006) (describing how law
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programs focus on the topic, 31 law firms have created new practice groups
devoted to transnational disputes, 32 and the American Bar Association has
attempted to facilitate transnational practice.33 Whatever the primary cause,
cases involving foreign elements and noncitizen defendants have increased
in number and are here to stay.34
The growth of this kind of litigation in the United States is only part of
the story. As other non-U.S. courts have expanded their jurisdictional
reaches-perhaps mirroring the once-broad ambitions of U.S. doctrine35 -
competition now exists among forums. 36 While dismissal in a U.S. court
once meant the practical end of litigation, 3 other forums increasingly
schools include transnational law in the first-year curriculum).
31. See, eg., Stewart Center on the Global Legal Profession JU Maurer School of Law); Center
on the Legal Profession Harvard Law School); Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration, and
Commercial Law (NYU School of Law); Center for Transnational Legal Studies (Georgetown
University Law Center); Center for Transnational Law and Business (University of Southern California
Gould School of Law); The Dickinson Poon Transnational Law Institute (King's College London).
32. For a discussion of some of these developments, see Childress, Rethinking Global Legahation,
supra note 9, at 1492, n. 5; Paul Dubinsky, Is Transnational Ltigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of
Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 303 (2008) (describing creation of
specialized practices); see also Press Release, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Gibson Dunn Launches
Transnatonalbtizgaion and Foreign Judgments Practice Group (Dec. 15, 2010).
33. See Laurel S. Terry and Carole Silver, TransnationalLegal Practice, 49 ABA/SIL YIR (n.s.) 413
(2015), available athttps: //papers.ssrn.com /sol3 /papers.cfmrabstract-id =2641159.
34. The introduction to the Fourth Edition of Gary Born and Bo Rutledge's well-known
casebook sums up the changes well. GARY BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS ix (5th ed. 2011) ("When the first edition of this book was
completed in 1988, the field of international civil litigation did not exist in the United States. No case
book addressed the subject and virtually no course at any major law school dealt with litigation of
international disputes. Today, almost twenty years later, the fourth edition of this book has been joined
by nearly a dozen ably-written competing casebooks on the subject of international civil litigation, a
course which is taught at law schools around the United States. Practitioners, as well as academics,
now regard international civil litigation as a vital, and profoundly challenging, area of the law."). For a
discussion of academic discourse focused on transnational litigation, see Childress, Rethinking Legal
Globalization, supra note 9, at 1501-06.
35. Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global btizgation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J.
INT'L L. 165, 166 & n.4 (2008) (describing spread of U.S.-style litigation, including class action
litigation, litigation funding, and punitive damages); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The
Globalization of American Law, 58 INT'L ORG. 103, 103 (2004) (taking the position that "American legal
style is spreading to other jurisdictions" driven by functional pressures and political incentives). For a
nuanced discussion of EU practice and how it differs from the U.S. approach, see Joanne Scott,
Extraterritoralip and Territoral Extension of EU Law, 62 AM.J. COMP. L. 87 (2013).
36. Marcus S. Quintanlilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multolaiy in Transnational
ibtigation: Foregn Courts, Foregn Judgments, and Foregn Law, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L. 31 (2012); see also Gregory
H. Shill, Endhng ]ugment Arbitrge. ]urs-ctional Competition and the Enforcement of Foreign Mon e Judgments
in the United States, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459 (2013) (describing increase of transnational disputes in
foreign courts); Eugene Gulland, AlI the World's a Forum, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13 ("Foreign
courts are increasingly asserting jurisdiction over U.S. companies .... "); seegeneraly Developments in the
Law: Extraterritoriali, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011) (describing increase in extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
37. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America andEngland. "A Rather Fantasdc Fiction,"
103 LAw Q. REV. 398, 418-20 (1987) (describing how those ousted from U.S. courts rarely pursue
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appear receptive to transnational law claims by foreign litigants.38 As Pamela
Bookman recently described in depth:
Three major developments signal foreign courts' growing
attractiveness to transnational litigants: the increasing availability of
higher damages awards, aggregate litigation, and alternative
litigation funding arrangements. These features are evolving against
a backdrop where the United States may no longer have the
substantive law with the strictest liability standards or with the
greatest extraterritorial reach, and foreign courts have relatively
permissive rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction. The result . . . [is a]
legal landscape with increasingly diverse forum choices for
plaintiffs. 39
Dismissed cases now also more often return to the U.S. in the form of
judgment enforcement proceedings. 40 At the very least, with broad
jurisdictional assertions the likelihood of parallel proceedings and
concurrent assertions of jurisdiction increase. 41
As the number of transnational cases have grown, so too have their
complexity. From intricate securities and derivatives regulation 42 to
transnational class actions, 43 courts struggle not only applying adjudicatory
jurisdiction principles-themselves often convoluted-but also to
understand the factual circumstances from which the cases arise. A number
of unresolved doctrinal questions44 and thorny conceptual and technical
litigation elsewhere).
38. Bookman, itiagadon Isolationism, supra note 15, at 1108-19 (describing in detail the growing
potential of foreign courts to attract transnational litigation); Donald E. Childress III, Escaping Federal
Law in Transnational Cases. The Brave New World of Transnational itigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015)
(describing forum competition in transnational cases);Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalijnug
CommercialbaUigaon, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (encouraging the filing of cases in foreign courts
and for "litigants from countries with ineffective judicial systems to have their cases adjudicated in the
courts of other nations that have better- func tioning judicial systems").
39. Bookman, ibtigation Isolationism, spranote 15, at 1110.
40. Pamela Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579
(2016). See also Christopher A. Whytock and Cassandra B. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1444 (2011) (describing "forum shopper's
remorse" with cases being heard by foreign judiciaries after being dismissed from a U.S. court on forum
non conveniens grounds); Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, supra note 27, at 506-16 (exploring
through empirical analysis transnational forum shopping).
41. Austen L. Parrish, DuplicativeForeign ibtigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2010).
42. See, eg., Hannah Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Laws: Managng
Jusa-ctional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 14 (2007); see also Junsun Park, Global Expansion of
National Securities Laws: Extrateritorali and]ur;-isctional Confli, 12 U.N.H. L. REV. 69 (2014).
43. Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied 'Consent" to Personal Ju.a;-ction in Transnational Class iazo, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 619 (2004); Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global Transnational ClassActions
and Personal ]uri-aJction, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 41 (2003).
44. See general Parrish, Soveregn, supra note 10; see also Friedrich Juenger, Personal ]ursction in the
United States and in the European Communiies A Compaison, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1195, 1198 (1984).
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issues (e.g., how to treat the internet and cyberspace in a territorial-based
system) 45 also have led to confusion and a degree of uncertainty.
While issues of personal jurisdiction have immediate significance to the
litigants-will the case go forward in a particular court-the question of
adjudicatory authority also implicates a range of court access questions.46
Where a plaintiff sues is often as important as under what law and how the
plaintiff litigates. If courts narrow the places a plaintiff can sue, some suits
are less likely to be filed. That concern is amplified in the international
context, where a foreign forum may be largely unavailable. Jurisdictional
decisions can also be a way for the courts to reach a particular outcome
without directly addressing the merits or the substantive law.
On the other hand, if U.S. courts provide broad court access,
disconnected from international agreement, forum shopping is encouraged
and reciprocity questions come to the fore. 47 Are we comfortable
encouraging other nations to provide forums for noncitizen plaintiffs to sue
U.S. individuals and companies even when the plaintiffs and the U.S. entities
have little or no connection to the foreign state? Other litigation strategies-
what one scholar has characterized as forum selling, reverse auctions, and
nonresident bias-may also be more pronounced in the international
litigation context.48 In this way, broad assertions of jurisdiction can lead to
greater regulatory divergence, overlapping concurrent jurisdiction, and
inconsistent obligations.
In international cases, personal jurisdiction doctrine has also become a
tool for avoiding violations of international norms. Under legislative
jurisdiction principles, Congress can assert that U.S. law applies anywhere in
the world even when doing so violates international law.49 While courts do
not lightly presume that Congress has regulated the conduct of foreigners
outside the United States 50 or in a way that would violate international law,51
those presumptions can be overcome and U.S. law now routinely applies
45. SeeJennifer Daskal, The Un-Terntona/irj' oData, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 365-78 (2015).
46. See Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immurio andthe &g to CourtAccesj, 93 B.U. L. Rev.
2033, 2037 (2013) (empirical amalysis finding that "the likelihood of meaningful court access in the
foreign state is often low when court access is denied in the United States.").
47. Frederich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping Domestic andlnternational, 63 TULANE L. REV. 553, 560,
564 (1989) (describing international forum shopping and foreign shopping abroad).
48. Daniel M. Mlermam, Rethinking Personal Juns-caion, 6 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 246 (2014).
49. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804);
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, ChevroningForeign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1182-83 (2007)
(noting that "Congress frequently enacts statutes that violate international law, apply extraterritorially,
or otherwise ignore notions of comity.").
50. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
51. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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outside U.S. borders. 52 Regulating conduct and activity anywhere in the
world runs the risk of violating international jurisdictional law, which
requires some substantial connection between the dispute and the nation
where the litigation is pending.53 As the Court has read almost no limits into
Congress's authority to regulate extraterritorially-so long as it says so
clearly-personal jurisdiction becomes a safeguard to prevent exorbitant
U.S. government overreach, and from exceeding the enforcement limits
imposed by public international law.54 It is also important in cases where
courts apply international law or foreign law, because in those instances
issues of prescriptive jurisdiction 55 often disappear. In contexts when
foreign and international law controls, personal jurisdiction may be the key
limitation on a court's power.56 And it can be the only backstop in cases
involving unilateral extraterritorial civil discovery, where personal
jurisdiction is often the critical, and only, restraint.57
At minimum, jurisdictional issues in international cases have the
potential for greater spillover effects than their domestic counterparts.
Broad assertions of jurisdiction, at least in some cases, may impact foreign
relations and frustrate diplomatic initiatives. 58 How often cases ultimately
implicate these concerns is unclear, but broad assertions of personal
jurisdiction, when perceived to be exorbitant, raise many of the same
52. See, e.g, CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
LAW 94-166, at 1 (Congressional Research Service, 94th ed. 2007) ("A surprising number of federal
criminal statutes have extraterritorial application .... ' ); see a/so Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work
of its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/61/10, at Annex E, 516 (2006) (describing the "increasingly
common phenomenon" of U.S. laws regulating foreign conduct). For an argument that common law
choice-of-law principles lead to extraterritorial application of law, see Katherine Florey, State Courts,
State Terrtouy, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoralio Princile in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1091 (2009).
53. See infra sections IV.A and IV.C, notes 168 and 179. Cf Florey, WhatPersonalJui-cstion Doctrine
Does, supra note 13, at 1238-42 (describing how personal jurisdiction "prevent borderline applications
of forum law).
54. Adjudicatory jurisdiction also becomes critical if the law that's being applied is itself derived
from international law. Anthony Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescthtive and
Adjud cariteusd4ction, 28 MD.J. INT'L L. 65, 68-70 (2013) (describing the issue).
55. Prescriptive jurisdiction, also sometmes referred to as legislative jurisdiction, is the power of
a state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation,
or by determination of a court." RESTATEMENT fTHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S., 401a) (Am. Law Inst. 1987). In the U.S., prescriptive jurisdiction questions often focus on the
issue of what conduct Congress intended to regulate when it enacted a statute.
56. Chimene I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitou Torts in Transnational Human &ghts Cases, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 81, 89 (2013).
57. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 34, at 968, 997 (describinghow U.S. courts are often willing to
order broad unilateral discovery of evidence located abroad if the court has personal jurisdiction).
58. Bassett, Implied 'Consent,' supra note 43, at 634; Gary B. Born, Reflections on Personal Jurisdction
in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 28-29 (1987) (describing how broad jurisdictional
assertions "can readily arouse foreign resentment" and "provoke diplomatic protests").
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frustrations that extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction engender. In this way,
the separation of powers issues (between the judicial and executive branch)
have the potential to be more pronounced in the international context. 59
And, of course, classic questions of resource allocation and judicial
competency exist related to what kinds of cases, against what kinds of
defendants, U.S. courts are best equipped to hear.60
B. The Interplay with International Lam
These issues surrounding jurisdiction in international cases, while
sometimes overlooked, are generally understood. Less appreciated is how
issues of personal jurisdiction, at least on the margins, can impact vertical
questions of law development. To the extent that domestic courts are readily
available to resolve transnational disputes, the incentive for the executive
and legislative branches to enter into collaborative bilateral or multilateral
solutions may be reduced.61 And while sub-state and local efforts can be
critical complements to multilateral, global efforts, 62 on their own they can
often lead to fragmentation and balkanization 63 and undermine meaningful,
more effective, global governance.64
Political scientist Tonya Putnam's recent work, while focused on
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, describes how this phenomenon can
occur.65 The antitrust law context is the classic example. The ability of
plaintiffs to sue foreigners for foreign activity in the U.S. provided a remedy
where none existed internationally, but ultimately reduced incentives for the
59. LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 289 (1986).
60. SeeJose Alvarez, The Internationafization ofU.S. Law, 47 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 537 (2009).
61. TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND U.S.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 6 (2016) ("Where U.S. extraterritoriality has proven effective in safeguarding
the transnational interests of U.S. entities, there is often little urgency for the U.S. government to
bargain with others over coordinated rules.").
62. See generally ALFRED AMAN & CAROL GREENHOUSE, TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
PROBLEMS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD (2017).
63. For a general discussion, see EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORGE W. DOWNS, BETWEEN
FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
(2017). For a recent description in the context of financial regulation, see Matthias Lehmann, Legal
Fragmentation, Extratertonalip and Uncertain p in Global Finanial Regulation, 37 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
406, 407-08 (2017) (describing how legal fragmentation and extraterritoriality are bemoaned, analyzing
the causes of fragmentation, and proposing the necessity of collaborative approaches).
64. Cf Ellen Gutterman, Banning Bribes Abroad U.S. Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Its Impact on the Global Go ernance of Corruption, EUR. POL. SCI. (Apr. 13, 2018), available at
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0153-z (arguing that U.S. extraterritorial application of the
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act "shapes international anti-corruption efforts in ways that may run
counter to effective governance practices and meaningful anti-corruption reform in the global
economy').
65. PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 6-7.
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U.S. to enter into a harmonized international regime. 66 Opening up
domestic courts to resolve international cases filled an enforcement gap, but
at the same time lessened pressure for the U.S. to find a politically palatable
or harmonized international solution. While in theory high-profile cases
might engender legislative solutions, 67 usually they have not.68 Personal
jurisdiction cases impose particular challenges because the constitutional
nature of the doctrine can later hamstring international negotiations, making
agreements more difficult to reach.69
At one time commentators thought differently. Scholars once
speculated that unilateral extraterritorial regulation, enforced through the
courts, might spur international efforts or serve as a stop-gap measure.7 0
This proved true in narrow set of cases. When a foreign nation refuses to
engage or consider harmonized solutions, unilateral extraterritorial
regulation may potentially serve as a political tool to bring the recalcitrant
party to the table. And it may be the only approach possible when dealing
with a small number of so-called rogue nations, unwilling to engage at all
with international norms.
But for the most part, the speculation proved wrong. International
harmonization is usually not the final result, and temporary measures have
often developed into long-standing practice even with allies where
multilateral agreement is possible. Moreover, in recent years, it is the U.S.
that has often been the stumbling block to international, collaborative
agreement. The U.S. has had a tendency, at least in the public law context,
to at times ignore its international legal obligations, 71 to read them
66. For example, the United States began applying its antitrust laws extraterritorially in the 1940s.
Yet not until 1999 did the United States enter its first bilateral antitrust agreement. Eleanor M. Fox,
Internationa/Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911, 912-13, 921 (2003); see also Andrew T.
Guzman, Antitrust and International Regu/atog Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1142 (2001) (proposing
internationalization over extraterritorial national regulation). See genera//y PUTNAM, supra note 61, at
149-51 (describing forces motivating U.S. preference for unilateralism).
67. See, eg., Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking 2.0,
71 STAN. L. REv. 9, 9 (2018) (describing how the CLOUD Act mooted "one of the most closely
watched Supreme Court cases" of the term).
68. Parrish, Rec/aiming International Law, supra note 6, at 871-72 (explaining how extraterritoriality
interferes with harmonization and multilateralism).
69. Linda Silberman, Comparative Jun sction in the International Context: Wi/ the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention Be Stalled? 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 320-27, 330-31 (2002); see also Fredrich K.
Juenger, TheAmercan Law of GeneralJuns-cdtion, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 163-65.
70. william S. Dodge, Extraterntona/ip and Conflict-of-Laws Theoy: An Argument for Ju c ial
Uni/aterasm, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 166-67 (1998) (suggesting that extraterritorial regulation can
spur cooperation by providing incentives to negotiate); John C. Coffee, Jr., iExtraterroia/ Financia/
Regu/ation: Why E.T Can't Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1261 (2014) (arguing that the
assertion of extraterritorial authority can be viewed as an "interim stage in the eventual development
of meaningful soft-law standards").
71. For a provocative argument along these lines, see PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD:
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES 227-28, 233 (2005) (arguing that
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narrowly,7 2 or to exhibit outright hostility to international norms.7 3 In these
situations, extraterritorial regulation, instead of having a salutary effect,
further reduces the incentive for the U.S. to negotiate or compromise,
because it can achieve its short-term goals unilaterally.7 4 The consensus
position outside the U.S. is that this unilateral action is also often unlawful
and illegitimate, further straining relationships.7 5
At any rate, the deck is artificially stacked in favor of unilateral action,
of which extraterritorial regulation is a particular form. Bilateral and
multilateral solutions take time, require sophisticated diplomacy, and often
demand compromise.76 The benefits of extraterritorial regulation for courts
and legislature are usually felt more immediately (providing relief for an
individual litigant), while the benefits of harmonized regulation can be
longer-term. Sometimes portraying foreigners and foreign systems as
causing harm is simply politically expedient. Xenophobia and the rhetoric
of strident nationalism, as well as anti-immigrant sentiment, can play a role,
too. Political incentives also may exist to target foreign activity and
conduct. 77 This was particularly true in the tough-on-crime movement
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
the U.S. had "such scant regard for the international rule of law" that after 9/11 it believed "the
rewriting of international conventions could be achieved unilaterally" and therefore would "trash an
international treaty by arguing that it posed a threat to American sovereignty"). More recently, a wide-
range of U.S. actions, from strikes in Syria to U.S. treatment of immigrants and refugees has been said
to violate international law. See, eg., Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administradon and International Law,
56 WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2017) (delivering the Foulston Siefkin Lecture) (describing international law
violations); Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking Mgrant Children From Parents is Illegal, U.N. Tells U.S., NEW
YORK TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-
migrant-children- families.htm (U.N. asserting that U.S. was violating international law).
72. Margaret F. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals and the Horizontal Integration of Human &ghts,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 759 (2006); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3- 11 (Michael Ignatieff ed. 2005) (describing how the U.S.
embraces exceptionalism and double standards).
73. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World &ght, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354 (2006) (describing a
strategy of "strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism characterized by a broad antipathy
toward international law"); Anupam Chander, G/obalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197
(2005) (describing the "dazzlingly broad" U.S. disengagement from multilateral treaties and
international legal obligations); see also Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
458, 458-60 (1998) (describing the U.S. failure to fully respect its treaty obligations in the 1990s).
74. For some of the problems with this approach, see Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police
the World< 13 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) ("Our actions would be more effective if
aimed at achieving international cooperation in ways consistent with the international legal order,
instead of simply asserting wider American prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction.").
75. For a discussion, see Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesp-U.S. ibtigation in the Mirror of
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 639-40 (2002) ("International lawyers have complained
about U.S. civil litigation for almost sixty years.").
76. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End. The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the
UnitedStates, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1241 (2008) (describing the limits of traditional treaties).
77 Paul B. Stephan, The PolitcalEconomy of Extraterrtonalip, 1 POL. & GOVERNANCE 92, 93-94
(2013) (explaining how one would predict that Congress would seek to protect domestic producers
and push for extraterritorial application of U.S. regulation because "foreign interests do not participate
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A form of exceptionalism may also be at play.78 Usually extraterritorial
regulation is driven by the belief that U.S. laws are better, or at least
substantively different, than foreign laws. 79 Once enacted, eliminating
existing extraterritorial regulation of foreigners is challenging and often not
politically viable. Those who are most impacted by extraterritorial laws do
not have a formal say in the political system, and are less equipped to prevent
their passage or to push for their repeal. Taken together, powerful nations
like the U.S. tend to embrace extraterritorial regulation. 80 This is
extraterritoriality's creep.
Cases involving non-resident foreign defendants-particularly those
cases brought by foreign plaintiffs-can have an impact on international law
and foreign law formation, too. Part of this is how legal norms migrate
between different legal systems,81 but also how international and domestic
law and politics feed off one another.82 Broad assertions of extraterritorial
power by the U.S. has led other nations to adopt similar, and sometimes
broader, approaches.8 3 If U.S. influence wanes somewhat as its role on the
in elections" and "it lacks foreign interlocutors to challenge its choices').
78. SeeJames C. Hathaway, Amenca, Defender ofDemocraticLegima, 11 EUR.J. INT'L L. 121 (2000)
(describing American exceptionalism); Harold Hongju Koh, On Ameican Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1480-87 (2003) (same); see generally AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISMAND HUMAN RIGHTS
(Michael Ignatieffed., 2005) (a collection of essays describing American exceptionalism in its different
forms).
79. IGNATIEFF, supra note 72 at 8-9 (describing in the human rights context a "judicial attitude"
"anchored in a broad popular sentiment that the land ofJefferson and Lincoln has nothing to learn
about rights from any other country').
80. Krisch,More Equal than the Rest, supranote 26, at 156 (describing U.S. use of domestic law as
a tool of foreign policy); see also Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and
the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 388 (2005) (describing U.S. reluctance
to use international treaties and resort to extraterritorial regulation).81. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalsm, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple
Ports of Entgi, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1574 (2006); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Do/lan ng State
and Professional Expertise Transnational Processes and Questions of LegitimiZation in State Tranformaion, 960-
2000, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 199
(Michael Likosky ed., 2002) (describing how ideas and norms are imported and exported).
82. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996); see also Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law as an Extension of Domestic Political
Conflict, 105 N.W. U. L. REV. 635 (2011); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Professor of Law, Indiana University
Maurer School of Law, Remarks at Conference: University Pantheon-Assas (Paris 2) The
Internationalization of Administrative Law: The Transnationalization of Domestic Law: A Perspective
from the United States (May 24-26, 2018) (describing how globalization has resulted in the
transnationalization of domestic administrative law in the U.S.). For an example, see Gutterman, supra
note 64 (describing how "the international regime of anti-corruption is an attempt by the USA to
internationalize specifically American norms concerning the conduct of international business" and
"that the central purpose of FCPA enforcement is to ensure competitive access to global markets by
US firms-not to control corruption more generally").
83. See genera//y Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW U. L. REV. 1 (2012); cf. Sarah C.
Kaczmorek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritona/ip and the National
Implementation of Foregn Bribeu Legislation, 65 INT'L ORGANIZATION 745 (2011) (empirical analysis
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international stage diminishes and as other competitors arise, it may be that
other domestic court systems will vie to become the primary generators of
substantive international norms. This is particularly true as the legal
profession in many respects globalizes. The worry is that norms developed
in other court systems through a global common law approach will not
necessarily be consistent with U.S. interests or consistent with basic notions
of human and environmental rights. At least one should anticipate that
courts in other countries will act strategically and in their own citizen's
interests.
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Given the importance of international cases and their implications, one
might expect the U.S. Supreme Court to have given these cases more
sustained attention. The awareness of the transnational dimensions of
personal jurisdiction, however, is a relatively new phenomenon. Only in its
most recent decisions does the Court appear more alert to their international
contexts,8 4 with hints that the Justices recognize that cases with foreign,
non-resident defendants raise distinct and different issues.
A. The Beginnings of Modern Doctrine (1945-1958)
The canonical story of personal jurisdiction is well understood. In 1945,
International Shoe broke with the past, moved beyond the strict territorial
conceptions of power articulated in Pennoyer and its progeny, and the
minimum contacts test was born.8 5 Since then, the Court has struggled to
determine how much of Pennoyers older scheme remains, and how much has
been replaced entirely.8 6 Oversimplified, Pennoyer is often painted as the
champion of sovereignty with a rigid territorial conception of power, while
Internationa!Shoe is viewed as the fountainhead of a modern doctrine focused
on fairness and individual liberty.87 Certainly as a descriptive matter, over
time the touchstone for determining adjudicatory jurisdiction in the
interstate context moved away from the geographic question of the
defendant's location, and moved toward asking whether requiring a
defendant to defend in a foreign forum was reasonable. Commentary on
describing responses to U.S. extraterritorial laws and identifying spillover effects).
84. Lower courts have struggled as well. See Childres s, Rethinking Legal G/obalizaton supra note 9,
at 1523, nn.175- 80 (isting lower court decisions).
85. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
86. Terry S. Kogm, A Neo- iederalit Tale of Personal ]uns-hion, 63 CAL. L. REV. 257, 270, 298
(1990).
87. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2019]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 59:97
these developments in the domestic context is extensive, with hundreds of
law review articles detailing the doctrinal twists and turns.8 8
The canonical story is incomplete. For one, it is oversimplified.
Sovereignty-based considerations never fully disappeared. Indeed,
International Shoe's minimum contacts standard remains dependent on
territorial considerations, requiring a certain relationship with the forum.89
The difference is that Pennoyer limited jurisdiction by express reference to
existing and fixed international and common law rules, while International
Shoe suggested states could "fashion new bases of jurisdiction. " 90 Arguably,
International Shoe was more focused on making "plain that legal fictions,
notably 'presence' and 'implied consent,' should be discarded." 91
In this vein, International Shoe can't be divorced from a number of its
cousins decided in the same era that advanced a particular approach to
judicial decision-making. International Shoe and its progeny reflected less a
coherent and overarching account of the allocation of state adjudicatory
authority in an international system, and more the triumph in the domestic
context of legal realism over legal formalism, a move to a more
individualized case-specific approach to judicial decision-making, and the
perceived value of standards over rules. Cases like Mullane92 and Eie 93 are
the most well-known of these cousins. But similar trends occurred in a wide
swath of law.94
International Shoe and the cases that followed also reflected broader
changes occurring in the nation. By the 1950s, no longer were civil disputes
88. For several well-known examples, see Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Junrdction,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32
B.C. L. REV. 529 (1991); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Junrsaction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 NW U. L. REV. 1112 (1981); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisaction, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 610 (1988); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. TrautmamJunsaiction toAdjudcate:A Suggested
Anaysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966). For several recent examples, see Adam Steinman, Access to
Justice, Rationalip, and Personal Jurisaiction, 71 VAND. L. REv. 1401 (2018); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer
Was &ght, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1313-1327 (2017); Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal
Jurisaiction and the "Interwebs," 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 (2015).
89. Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jundiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1591-92 (describing how
that without minimum contacts "a state can have no interest would justify its hearing the case" and
that "[flor it to do so under such circumstances would constitute an improper infringement on the
interests of one or more other states").
90. For this point, see Juenger, Personal Jurisaiction, supra note 44 at 1198.
91. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[1]n International Shoe itself and
decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably 'presence' and 'implied
consent,' should be discarded, for they conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction rests.'); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Main, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(International Shoe "cast ... aside" fictions of "consent" and "presence").
92. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
93. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realsm, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 347,
347 (describing how doctrines of adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction were "swept clear of nearly
all rules, at least those that [could] be applied in more or less determinate fashion").
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so local. Interstate disputes were increasingly becoming common in the
post-World II economy as corporations and other entities grew in size and
number, and law took on a more prominent role in a national economy.95
The great changes in the 1930s and 1940s had enhanced federal power,96
and following the Second World War the expansion of civil and individual
rights with the Warren Court depended on relatively strong federal judicial
power.97 Broad assertions of federal power, including federal judicial power,
were essential to carrying out the expansion of regulatory authority that
existed post-New Deal.98 Shortly after, the great revolution in choice of law
and conflicts made state territorial limitations on power in whatever
context they appeared-seem quaint.99 And soon after it became popular to
declare sovereignty dead, at least when describing "our federalism." 100
These cases from the 1940s and 1950s, as focused as they were on the
growth of national power relative to state power within the U.S., did not
particularly pay attention to the international system. In some respects, they
represented a step back from international law. In Pennoyer, public
international law was the backdrop upon which the Due Process Clause
operated, 101 and Pennoyer specifically relied on Wheaton's treatise on
95. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautmam, Judction toAdjudzcate:A SuggestedAnaysis,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1146-47 (1966) (explaining how the "growing mobility and complexity of
modem life" lies behind jurisdictional developments in the field).
96. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (broadly interpreting the Federal's Government's
power under the Commerce Clause).
97. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM (1st
ed. 1953); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (book review).
98. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2002)
("In the New Deal and immediate postwar eras, domestic regulatory law expanded markedly in the
U.S. and across the globe.").
99. Perry Dane, Vested &ghts, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1194-1205 (1987)
(describing revolution in American choice of law); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of
Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2454-70 (1999) (setting out history of choice of law
theory and move away from territorial theories most associated with Joseph Beale and the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws). For a recent discussion, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Deteiri g oe Terrtoral
Scope of State Law in Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and on the
Role of Paro Autonomy, 27 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 381, 386-95 (2017).
100. Heather Gerken, FederalismAll the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2010) (noting "that
scholars regularly announce the death of sovereignty" but that "they remain haunted by its ghost")
(citing Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950)); Heather Gerken,
Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2017) (noting "the stubborn facts of modernization shifted
federalism debates away from the separate spheres approach, which depicts states and the federal
government as dual sovereigns confined to their own regulatory empires.").
101. See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of PersonalJuds-cion, 63 CAL. L. REV. 257, 270, 298
(1990) (explaining how personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States was "clearly an outgrowth
of common law principles of international sovereignty' and that Pennoyer engrafted "the sovereignty-
based international law approach to territorial jurisdiction").
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international law in reaching its decision. 102 International Shoe, while still
drawing from international law principles, broke with this tradition, creating
its own standard for domestic cases by purporting to interpret what the Due
Process Clause itself required. While it may or may not have encapsulated a
federalism principle for interstate interaction, it did not purport to consider
the structural limits of the international system.
Only one personal jurisdiction case in this era involved a foreign
defendant. In 1952, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,10 3 a plaintiff
sued a Philippines corporation doing business in Ohio during World War II
on claims arising in the Philippines. But in many ways the case was not an
international case at all, given that the foreign corporation had fully
relocated its headquarters to Ohio. But the court did not distinguish foreign
defendants of other countries from "foreign" defendants of other U.S.
states. The Court certainly didn't discuss international law, and restricted
itself to questions of federal due process. 10 4
This is not entirely surprising. The 1950s was hardly a friendly time for
international law (urisdictional or otherwise). 105 As much as federal rights
were overshadowing state rights, 10 6 so too was federal authority, in the form
of American exceptionalism, amassing power relative to international law.
The shadow of Erie also perhaps loomed large. Just as federal law became
more important, Erie made integrating international law more difficult.107 At
the same time, in the U.S., territorial limits on other forms of jurisdiction l0 8
and in conflicts of law109 were also beginning to erode, and in both contexts
sometimes arguably in violation of international norms.110 And for a variety
102. Pennqyer, 95 U.S. at 722. This reliance on international law was consistent with a large number
of early decisions. See Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367 (1873); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 165, 174 (1850); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255 (1827); seegeneraly Roger
H. Trmsgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Junsction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 872 &
nn.116-20 (1989) (listing cases approaching personal jurisdiction using principles from the Law of
Nations).
103. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
104. Id.
105. Louis Henkn, U.S. Ratication ofHuman Rihts Conventions The Ghost ofSenator Bncker, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
106. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA (2000).
107. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationaaijnag International Law: Essa in Honor ofLouis Henkn, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121 (1998).
108. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (expamding
jurisdiction based on effects). For a general overview, see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE
CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW
(2009).
109. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter- Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 377 (1966).
110. P.C.F. Pettite & C.J.D. Slyles, The International Response to the Extraterntonal Application of United
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of reasons, defendants rarely invoked international law to check
jurisdictional overreach.11 1
B. The National Cases (1975- 1990)
From 1958 until 1977, the Court decided no personal jurisdiction
decisions. The next line of cases, from the late 1970s and 1980s-cases like
Wor/d-Wide Volkswagen Cop. v. Wloodson,112 Burger King Cop. v. Rudzewiz, 113
and Asahi Me/alIndustries Co. r. Superior Cour'14-are usually portrayed as the
Court struggling to apply the new doctrine laid down in International Shoe.
And that's true. From a transnational perspective, though, the 1970s and the
1980s decisions were squarely national cases-focused on national issues,
federalism debates, and the rise of legal realism-even when those cases had
international elements.
Common law limits on jurisdiction drawn from public international law
had been replaced in domestic, interstate cases with independent
Constitutional limits. As the American economy continued to grow and
transform, the Court continued to feel pressure to expand the scope of
personal jurisdiction. Federal power was still ascendant in the 1970s and
early 1980s, as this was before the height of the state rights movement of
the Rehnquist Court,115 and long before the new federalism backlash that
sought to constrain the power of state court authority vis-a-vis other
states. 116 Interstate relations faded so far into the background that state
borders began to mean less in the personal jurisdiction context. Indeed, in
the early 1980s, the majority of academic commentary sought to explain
States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982) (describing defensive measures imposed in response to
aggressive U.S. regulation).
111. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialit and Fifth Amendment Due Process,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992).
112. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
113. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
114. Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
115. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court- A Preliminag Anaysis, 47 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 569 (2003) (describing the first Rehnquist Court lasting from 1986 to 1994 and the focus
in the 1990s on federalism and localism); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (2006) (describing the narrowing and constraining of federal
power under the Rehnquist Court).
116. For a discussion of these issues, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of EquaSoeregnp, 65 DUKE
L. J. 1087 (2016); Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008) (a systematic
scrutiny of horizontal federalism); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territoal States. The
Constitutiona Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (describing constitutional limits
on state power); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article f7 and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468
(2007) (discussing the horizontal aspects of federalism). For scholarship discussing extraterritoriality
in the U.S. state context, see Mark D. Rosen, State Extratertoa Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1133 (2010); Katherine Florey, State Cour,; State Terto, State Power: Reflections on the
Extratertoali Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057 (2009).
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either how the court's personal jurisdiction doctrine still reflected at least
some aspect of interstate federalism or didn't reflect anything about
federalism at all.117
Against this backdrop, the small number of personal jurisdiction cases
that had international dimensions were lumped together with their domestic
counterparts. 118 From 1952 (when Perkins was decided) through 2011, only
three cases before the Supreme Court had international elements: InsuranceCo. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites,1 19 Helicopteros Naciona/es i. Ha!!,12 0 and
Asahi Me/al Industries Co. r. Superior Court.121 With the exception of Asahl
none of them paid explicit attention to the international aspects of the case,
and none mentioned international law. The "cases routinely applied the
minimum contacts test developed in domestic cases, without addressing
whether the standard was appropriate in the international context." 122 At the
same time, scholarly commentary about international litigation was sparse,
with the most influential articles not appearing until the 1980s. 123
In hindsight there were reasons for this approach. For over a century,
the international limits on jurisdiction were basically the same as the
domestic limits. No need existed to make a distinction because both were
largely drawn from the same limits of sovereign authority. It was only as
domestic law moved away from state sovereignty as a limit on authority that
domestic and international law began to diverge. Domestically, the Court
began to place increased emphasis on "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice," focusing on the reasonableness and fairness of
jurisdiction. 124 This change occurred at the same time that the more formal,
117. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Junsd-ction: A Theoretical E aluation, 75
Nw. U. L. REv. 1112 (1981) (famously arguing that state borders and federalism should not play any
role in personal jurisdiction); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Juns-ction, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 1015 (1983) (explaining the limited role that federalism plays in the personal jurisdiction analysis);
Allan R. Stem, Spyes oArgument and Interstate Federalism in the Law ofPersonal Jun-cstion, 65 TEX. L. REV.
689, 689 (1987) (arguing for the continued importance of state borders and that jurisdictional assertions
should "reflect the general limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal system").
118. Parrish, Soveregno, supra note 10, at 4-5 (collecting sources and describing how courts and
commentators traditionally do not distinguish between domestic and international cases in the personal
jurisdiction context); see also Edward B. Adams, Jr., Personal Juaiction Over Foregn Paruie, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL
COURTS 113, 114 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (explaining how the same standards apply for personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants and U.S. defendants).
119. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
120. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
121. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
122. Born, supra note 58, at 6; cf. Juenger, PersonalJuns-aiction in the United States, supra note 44, at
1202.
123. See, eg., Degnan & Kane, supra note 21; Lilly, spranote 21.
124. See Pamela J. Stephens, Sotereignp and Personal ju,.s-ction Doctne Up the Stream of Commerce
Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 105 (1991) (describing how International Shoe and later cases
broke from the theory of sovereignty underlying adjudicatory jurisdiction).
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brighter lines rules of jurisdiction gave way to more free-flowing interest-
balancing, similar to what had happened in the conflicts revolution and the
interest balancing that briefly held sway in the legislative jurisdiction context
in the late 1970s and 1980s.125
A striking example is found with Insurance Corp. of Ireland. That case
involved a Delaware company doing business only in the Republic of
Guinea, which bought insurance from a broker in London, England to
cover the Guinea operations. 126 After the non-U.S. insurance companies
failed to pay on a claim, the Delaware company brought suit in
Pennsylvania. 127 The London insurers claimed the U.S. court lacked
personal jurisdiction and filed for summary judgment. 128 The plaintiff
served discovery, the defendants refused to respond, and the court issued
sanctions. 129 The question was whether jurisdiction existed for the lower
court to issue discovery sanctions.
While a relatively short decision, the Court's opinion is most known for
Justice White's focus on individual liberty. His opinion observed that "the
personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter
of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Any restrictions
imposed by individual U.S. state sovereignty, White explained, "must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause" because "the Clause itself makes no mention of
federalism concerns." 130 In this way, the statement in Insurance Corp of Ireland
appeared to be a retreat from the Court's explanation in WTorld-Wide
Volkswagen that, in the domestic context, the Due Process Clause served two
related functions: (1) to "protect the defendant against the burden of
litigating in a distant ... forum"; and (2) to "ensure that the States ... d[id]
not reach out beyond the limits imported on them by their status as co-equal
sovereigns in a federal system." 131
Yet it was clear that White was addressing interstate federalism and the
sovereignty of states, not the sovereignty of nations. Many believe the
125. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying
interest balancing); Mannmgton Mill, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (same);
see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Atorney General in a Global Age; Public Interests in Private
International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 227 (2001) (describing the rise and fall of
interest balancing). The Supreme Court appeared to reject the reasonableness requirement in 1993.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
126. 456 U.S. at 696-98.
127. Id. at 698.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 698-700.
130. Id. at 703, n.10.
131. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) ("The concept of
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions.").
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Court's decision in Insurance Cotp. of Ireland and its rejection of sovereignty
considerations was a direct response to Martin Redish's seminal 1981 article,
which objected to the use of federalism considerations in the personal
jurisdiction analysis. 132 But similar to White, Redish's article was limited to
addressing whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause
encapsulated interstate federalism concerns. His article did not address the
structural limitations of the international system. At best it might be said
that Redish believed the Due Process Clause did not encapsulate those
international considerations. Or said differently, Redish's point was not that
a nation-state's sovereign power was limitless, but rather that the
Constitution wasn't the source of those limits. 133
It was not until Asahi was decided in 1987 that the Court expressly
recognized that international cases presented special considerations. 134 That
case arose when a motorcycle's rear tire exploded in California, causing the
motorcycle to collide with a tractor. 135 The California motorcyclist sued
several defendants, including the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube,
alleging the parts were defective. 136 Ultimately, the plaintiffs' claims were
settled, leaving only an indemnity claim that had been brought by the
Taiwanese tire manufacturer against a Japanese manufacturer of the tire's
stem valve assembly. The issue before the Court was whether the California
court had specific jurisdiction over the Japanese corporation by virtue of it
having placed "goods into interstate or international commerce" that
eventually caused harm in California. 137
In Asahi, the Court ultimately found it unreasonable for the Japanese
corporation to have to defend an indemnity claim in California brought by
132. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jusction: A Theoretical Etaluation, 75
NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981); see Robertj. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or "Totalio of the Circumstances"2 It's
Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten out the Personal Junrsction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV.
53, 79 n.163, 88 n.229 (2004) (noting how the Court "would ... agree with Redish's argument, but
without mentioning his article"); see also Winton D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old
Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 199, 214 n.50 (1990) (describing how Professor Redish influenced
the Court and "forced a hasty retreat" from reliance on interstate federalism as a concern of personal
jurisdiction).
133. Redish, supranote 132, at 1114 (describinghow the interests of private parties should be the
raison d'etre for constitutionally limiting the reach of state personal jurisdiction, rather than concerns
of interstate sovereignty); Degnan & Kane, supranote 21, at 815, n.69 (noting how Redish and others,
whether right or wrong in the interstate context, "do not undercut the validity of the Court's statements
regarding the sovereignty basis for jurisdiction in the international order").
134. See Childress, Rethinking Legal Globalization, supra note 9, at 1521 (describing "transnational
reasonableness factors" as: (1) the "procedural and substantive policies of other nations"; (2) the
"unique burdens" placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system; and (3) the
foreign relations implications of the cases).
135. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06.
136. Id. at 106.
137. Id.
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the Taiwanese corporation. 138 The Court warned that the burden of
mounting a defense in a foreign legal system is "unique." As the Court
cautioned: "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending our
notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field." And due
process requires a court to "consider the procedural and substantive policies
of other nations whose interests are affected" by the assertion of
jurisdiction. 139 Asahi made clear with its two-pronged approach that the
Court must first have power to hear a case (determined by the relationship
between the forum and the defendant), before it would consider various
interests in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction. In this respect, while
not addressing the differences between state power in the interstate versus
international context, it adopted an approach that: (1) would limit authority
of courts through principles of sovereignty; and (2) then apply comity-based
considerations to decline jurisdiction when doing so was appropriate under
the facts of the case. 140
Asahi raised more questions than it answered. The Court mostly
"focused on the distance that the [foreign] defendant would be forced to
travel to defend itself," and the other burdens the defendant would face. 141
The Court did not articulate what exact weight to afford foreign interests,1 42
and lower courts after Asahi displayed a great deal of uncertainty as to how
to account for them. 143 It was unclear how interest balancing
(reasonableness analysis) mapped onto other comity-based doctrines (e.g.,
forum non conveniens). Following Asahi, the stream of commerce analysis-the
other main issue in the case-dominated the jurisdictional landscape and
the international aspects of cases were largely overlooked. 144
138. For a discussion, see Adam N. Steinman, Access to justice, Rationalip, and PersonalJunsdhcion, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1437, nn.202-204 (2018).
139. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
140. Comity in the form of second prong of the personal jurisdiction amalysis is used in a way
akin to its use in judicial abstention,fum nn onveniens, and other contexts. For the seminal article, see
David L. Shapiro, Juns-caion andDiscetion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985); see also Hon. Henryj. Friendly,
Inaiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
141. Earl M. Matz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jun sction: A Comment on Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669, 679 (1987).
142. Degnan & Kane, supra note 21, at 800 (noting that Asahi only recognized that courts should
be aware of the special burdens imposed on aliens, but "failed to adequately come to grips with what
special consideration ought to be given").
143. See Parrish, So-,ereignfy ,supra note 10, at 22-25 (citing cases); see also Leslie W. Abramson,
Claning F air Play and Substantial Justice" How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal
Jurisdction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1991).
144. Dubinsky, supranote 32, at 306, 355-57; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 34; Childress,
Rethinking Legal Globalization, supra note 9.
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C The International Cases (2011 -Present)
After Asahi, the Supreme Court neglected personal jurisdiction in
international cases for almost a quarter century. Beginning in 2011, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court began to hear a flurry of transnational cases in the
personal jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction contexts. 145 The cases'
transnational elements, for the first time, seemed more at the forefront of
the Court's attention, 146 even though the Court continued to decline to
explicitly create a different doctrinal standard when non-resident, foreign
defendants are involved. 147 Convoluting the analysis in all these cases,
however, was the Court's turn away from the legal realism driven
approaches developed in the 1970s and 1980s, the resuscitation of bright
line rules, as well as the dislike by some justices of private rights litigation.
Indeed, these other considerations, animated by a strikingly different vision
of judging than what existed during the earlier era (at least until the mid-
1980s), may well have motivated the results. Nevertheless, the international
context also loomed large.
The first significant case was J. McIntyre Machine{y v. Nicastro. In that case,
a plaintiff suffered a serious injury while operating a shearing machine in
NewJersey, at the company where he worked.148 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit
in New Jersey against the British manufacturer of the shearing machine.149
The issue was whether personal jurisdiction existed over the British
corporation. Writing for a plurality in a splintered opinion, Justice Kennedy
found jurisdiction lacking because the foreign defendant had insufficient
contacts with New Jersey.
The plurality relied heavily on sovereignty-based considerations in its
145. As Linda Silberman recently noted, "we are in an era in which transnational cases are the
norm rather than the exception." Silbermam, End ofan Era, supra note 19, at 692.
146. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business ofPersonalJunschion,
67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 777 (2017) (arguing that in recent cases the "Court was driven more by
a commitment to formalist evaluation of individual cases and a generalized resistance to allowing
United States courts to serve as a magnet for transnational litigation."); David L. Noll, The New Conflicts
Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEx LITIG. 41, 42 (2014) (explaining how in diverse areas, including in the
personal jurisdiction context, "the Supreme Court has restricted private regulatory enforcement in U.S.
courts to prevent interference with foreign nations' efforts to regulate harm"); cf. Childress, Rethinking
Legal Globalization, supra note 9, at 1494 (arguing that the Court "never addressed the transnational facts
of the cases [in Mclnre and Goodyead").
147. Florey, supra note 13, at 1248 ("Although it is at times clear that members of the Court have
been primarily driven by concern for non-U.S. defendants, the Court in its recent cases has not made
any formal distinction between the doctrine applicable to foreign defendants and U.S. ones . . .");
Childress, Rethinking Legal Globalization, supra note 9, at 1494 (explaining how the Court based its
decisions on domestic personal jurisdiction doctrine).
148. Nwcastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
149. Id.
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decision, emphasizing that the "United States is a distinct sovereign." 150 As
others have described, Justice Kennedy "repeatedly spoke about personal
jurisdiction in structural terms of judicial power, sovereignty, and sovereign
authority, submission by the defendant (through its conduct) to the power
of the sovereign, and the invalidity of a 'judgment rendered in the absence
of authority."' 151 While noting that different considerations can be in play,152
Justice Kennedy drew a direct connection to the Court's legislative
jurisdiction cases, explaining that the limitation on lawful power "with
respect to the power of the sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial
process" exist just as they do "with respect to the power of the sovereign to
prescribe rules of conduct."153 Perhaps this could have been predicted. The
Court the prior term had decided a landmark legislative jurisdiction case in
Mornison v. NationalAustralia Bank that had imposed territorial limitations on
legislative jurisdiction through a strong version of the presumption against
extraterritorialty.154
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent reached a different conclusion on the
facts. But while she was not inclined to focus on sovereignty (particularly as
it related to NewJersey as a state), she too was keenly aware of the lawsuit's
international context. While Justice Ginsburg found that the defendant had
targeted the United States (something Justice Kennedy did not agree with
factually, as his focus was on New Jersey), she was clear that domestic
federalism concerns were not in play and that the critical issue related to the
United States as a nation within an international system.155
The Court's decision in Daimler v. Bauman-decided just a few years
later-was also motivated, in part, by a recognition that foreign, nonresident
defendants raise different considerations. In Daimler, the case involved
Argentinian plaintiffs suing Mercedes-Benz for actions taken during the
Argentinian "Dirty War." 156 The Court concluded that doing business in a
state was insufficient; rather, the key question was whether the defendant
was "at home" in the forum. 157 The Court was "driven in substantial part by
concern for the plight of foreign defendants," 158 worried that a "global
150. Id. at 2789.
151. Wassermm, supra note 7, at 320 (citingMclnore, 131 S. Ct. at 2790-91).
152. Nwcastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 ("A sovereign's legislative authority to regulate conduct may
present considerations different from those presented by its authority to subject a defendant to
judgment in its courts.').
153. Id. at 2787-88.
154. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
155. NMcastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 ("[N]o issue of the fair and reasonable allocation of adjudicatory
authority among States of the United States is present in this case.").
156. Daim/er, 134 S. Ct. at 751-52.
157. Id. at 760-62.
158. Florey, supra note 13, at 1247.
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reach" would lead to "exorbitant" jurisdictional assertions) 59 Writing for
the Court, Justice Ginsburg noted specifically that "the transnational
context of [the] dispute bears attention" and "the risks to international
comity" should be part of the jurisdictional analysis, recognizing that broad
jurisdictional approaches had previously "impeded negotiations of
international agreements" on jurisdictional and judgment enforcement,160
and that general jurisdiction based on "doing business" had resulted in
"international friction." 161 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor also paid
particular attention to the international context while disagreeing with the
majority's approach.1 62
Regardless of whether one agrees with the Court's ultimate result and
its "at home" formulation, two aspects of the decision are notable for
international litigation. First, Daimler (and the earlier Goodyear decision)
responded to earlier calls that suggested "doing business" jurisdiction was
not consistent with international norms. 163 In this respect, the decisions
better align practices in U.S. courts with international practice.1 64 Second,
the motivations behind the Court's pronouncements in general jurisdiction
cases seemed not too far divorced from what was occurring in the legislative
jurisdiction context. 165 For legislative jurisdiction, the Court presumes that
Congress generally does not intend to usually utilize extraterritorial
jurisdiction, precisely because of its disfavored status under international
law.166
Reading the cases in their international context also helps make sense of
159. Daim/er, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62.
160. Id. at 763.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding the exercise of jurisdiction
unreasonable "given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign
conduct, and given that a more appropriate forum is available").
163. See, e.g, Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Junsdclion, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (recommending limitations on general jurisdiction when foreign country
defendants are involved); see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth ofGenera(Juns-cdion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
611-22, 633-34 (1988) (recommending elimination of "doing business" jurisdiction and restricting
general jurisdiction to the defendant's home-that is, to its place of incorporation and principal place
ofbusiness).
164. Bookman, Utizgation Isolationism, supra note 15, at 1140 (describinghow the Court's decisions
in Daim/er and Goodyear "brought general personal jurisdiction doctrine into line with international
accepted ideas"); see also Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot 'At Home"?. Daimler Bauman and the
End ofDoing Business Junsdtion, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2014).
165. RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Euro. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2116 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(invoking international jurisdictional law to support the majority's conclusion); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 131-32 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reaching the same conclusion as Justice Breyer in Kobe); see also Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 274-86 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing concern over the breadth of U.S.
jurisdictional assertions).
166. See Rutherglen, supra note 8 (proposing a presumption against personal jurisdiction similar
to the presumption against extraterritoriality).
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the greater unanimity between the Court's more liberal and more
conservative wings. Some commentators predicted that "one might have
expected the liberal wing of the Court to push for a longer jurisdictional
reach for state and federal courts." 167 But while the more liberal justices
disagreed with the implications of what appeared to be the Court stepping
back from its earlier precedent they appeared, at least partly, disturbed with
the broadest projection of judicial power around the world. 168 Some of the
justices specifically "sought to alleviate discord between the procedural
regimes of the United States and those of other countries." 169
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFERENCE
The Justices' inclination to treat international cases as distinct is
undoubtedly correct. The primary difference is that public international law
imposes limits in those cases, which do not apply in the domestic context.
Other keypractical and logistical differences exist. This section renews the call
for courts to more explicitly distinguish interstate from international cases.17 0
A. International Law's Limits
While often overlooked by U.S. courts, public international law
modestly constrains a state's jurisdictional authority over non-resident alien
defendants for conduct occurring abroad. These procedural jurisdictional
limits constrain U.S. courts-at least absent an explicit and clear statement
by Congress that it wishes to authorize U.S. courts to engage in activity
prescribed as unlawful under international law.
i. The Weight of Authoriy
Canonical treatises underscore how some form of connection is usually
always necessary between the state and the defendant to comply with
167. See Michael Vitiello, LimtingAccess to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Courts New Personal Judcction
Case Law, 21 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (2015).
168. The Court's more liberal justices are cognizant of the global context. See, e.g, STEPHEN
BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES
(2015).
169. Alan M. Trammell, IsolatingbaUtgantsA Response to Pamela Bookman, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
33, 35 (August 15, 2015) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg is the opposite of a litigation isolationist); see
also Parrish, Fading Extratertona , supra note 15, at 212-13 (describing the Court's concerns about
the overextension of American power in a number of cases).
170. Parrish, Soterenp, supra note 10. For two recent examples: Childress, Rethinking Legal
Globalization, supra note 9, at 1518 ("Transnational cases are different from domestic ones when
questions of personal jurisdiction arise."); Florey, supra note 13, at 1234-40 (arguing for different
jurisdictional approaches to foreign defendants).
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international law.171 Courts have traditionally reached the same conclusion
that international law imposes some constraints. 172 So too have many
scholars from long ago,173 more recently,174 and today.175 U.S. Government
171. See, eg., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298, 306-08 (4th
ed. 1990) (describing the requirement of a sufficient nexus between the subject matter and the state to
justify a state's assertion of jurisdiction); LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
136-37, at 456 (9th ed. 1992) ("[International law ... determines the permissible limits of a state's
jurisdiction .... ."); Vaughan Lowe, Jusd-ction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
2d ed. 2006) (same); see a/so LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 224-49 (1989) (describing the allocation of international adjudicatory
jurisdiction); MARY KEYES, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 190 (2005) (discussing
different opinions but explaining how public international law limits the scope of adjudicatory
jurisdiction).
172. See, e.g, Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1917) (noting that before the
Fourteenth Amendment courts applied "the rules of international law" to resolve jurisdiction
questions). See also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Repub. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) (describing
customary international law as imposing limits on the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts); Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Zhang (2002), 210 CLR 491, 528-29 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.) (explaining
that principles of public international law require "a substantial and bona fide connection between the
subject matter and the source of jurisdiction" and concluding that "no country's legal system can ignore
the influence of public international law").
173. See, e.g.,Joseph H. Beale, TheJurisd-ction ofaSovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 243 (1923)
("[T]he sovereign cannot confer legal jurisdiction on his courts or his legislature when he has no such
jurisdiction according to the principles of international law."); F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurs-ction in
International Law, 111 RECUIEL DES COURS 1, 14, 17, 73-81 (1964) ("Wherever its international
implications are concerned, 'jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is limited by
rules of international law." and that international law imposes substantial limits on civil jurisdiction);
L.I. De Winter, Excessive Juns-c'tion in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 706 (1968)
(describing areas of exorbitant adjudicatory jurisdiction under private international law).
174. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS 47, 80 (1996) (noting that "the subject of judicial jurisdiction is best understood
within a framework of international law"); Francesco Francioni, Extraterritorial Application of
Environmental Law, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 125 (Karl
Matthias Meessen ed.) (1996) (exploring "the assertion that extraterritorial adjudicatory jurisdiction"
in some circumstances "may well constitute a breach of an international 'due process' standard");
Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in
Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373 (1995) (describing the international law related to adjudicatory
jurisdiction); Campbell McLachlan, The Influence of International Law on Civil Jusdction, in HAGUE
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1993) (describing international law's limits on civil
jurisdiction); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 107, at 1221-22 (noting that while "the authority is rather
thin" that "international law limits federal long arm statutes, at least if Congress has not been specific
about its intent to override it"); Degnan & Kane, supra note 21, at 814-15 (describing how as "a
principle of international law" personal jurisdiction is limited and that "[n]otions of sovereignty and
territoriality form the basis for limiting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction in the international realm");
Born, supra note 57, 16-20 (explaining that personal jurisdiction is limited by international law).
175. See, e.g, Donald Earl Childress III, Jursdiction: Limits under International Law, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1051, 1052-53 (2017) (setting out international
law limits, but noting "[t]he view that international law imposes restraints on personal jurisdiction is,
however, not universally accepted."); Ralf Michaels, Jusdiction: Foundations, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1042, 1043 (2017) (describing how public international law sets "the
outer boundaries of jurisdiction" through public international law's limits on the exercise of sovereign
power and through human rights law); Alex Mills, Rethinking Jursdiction in International Law, 84 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (2014) (describinghow public international law limits judicial jurisdiction); Dubinsky,
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officials agree, too.176
This is not to say that international law's limits in civil cases are well-
defined. They are not. The limits are amorphous, leading the specifics to be
developed by individual states.177 The limits that do exist come into play
only at the margins, and notably international law has not specified what to
do in the face of conflicting and overlapping jurisdiction.178 The limits have
also regularly been neglected by American commentators where, as a result
of our dualist system, 179 international law is not often the focus of analysis.
And in recent years, legislative jurisdiction has been front and center of most
discussions of jurisdictional limits, which has often obviated the need for
addressing adjudicatory jurisdiction. 180 In Europe, in contrast, the limits
imposed by customary international law have been supplanted by EU
regulation, which means that common law development has stalled.181 But
absent party consent, generally some connection, if not a "substantial
connection," must exist between the state and the defendant for the exercise
of jurisdiction to be lawful.18 2
supra note 32, at 333 ("Because of the dearth of U.S. treaties relating to adjudicative jurisdiction, in a
transient jurisdiction case in a U.S. court, the key international law question is whether the exercise of
jurisdiction violates customary international law."); cf. CHARLES T. KUTOBYJR. & LUKE A. SOBOTA,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND NORMS
APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, 164-65 (2017) ("Perhaps the most that can be said is
that the exercise of jurisdiction without any articulable or logical connection to the parties and the
dispute is rare, difficult to justify, and unlikely to be recognized elsewhere.").
176. See, eg., David R. Robinson, Speech Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Feb. 14, 1984), in 1981-1988 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ch. 6, 1 at 1330 (statement by then-Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department
of State that "[i]f there is a universally recognized prohibitive rule, it is that a state may not exercise
jurisdiction over events or persons abroad unless that state has some genuine link with those events
or persons."); David H. Small, Managing ExtraterntonaJunshctional Problems: The United States Government
Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 292 (1987) (noting that "U.S. government spokesmen
identified only one firmly established international law linit-a threshold requirement that a state have
a sufficient nexus with the matter to justify an assertion of jurisdiction."); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 34, at 100 (citing diplomatic protests in the 1940s and 1970s where the U.S. government
protested other nation's exercise of personal jurisdiction as violating U.S. sovereignty).
177. Childress, Jund'tion: Limits, supra note 175, at 1052 ("the international law standards
applicable to assertions of judicial jurisdiction are best described as amorphous").
178. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 5, 142-43 (2d ed. 2015).
179. J G Starke, Monism and Dualsm in the Theou of International Law, 17 BRIT. YB INT'L L. 66
(1936); RESTATEMENT fTHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 55, 115
(1), 403, cmt. y; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 34, at 604 ("If Congress enacts legislation in
violation of international law, it is well settled that U.S. courts must disregard international law and
apply the domestic statute.").
180. See supra note 6.
181. See, eg., Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (Brussels I Regulation (Recast)); Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
2007 O.J. (L339) 3 (Lugano Convention).
182. See ALI/UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 18-19, 104
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These personal jurisdictional limits are an essential structural
component of an international legal system designed to reduce conflict and
support democratic self-governance. A requirement that some connection
or link exist between the state and the defendant derives from basic public
law principles of state equality, 183 sovereignty, self-determination, and non-
intervention.184 Broad assertions of judicial power over conduct or parties
abroad and the unilateral projection of a state's own regulatory interests
interferes with the rights of foreign states to control their own affairs and of
individuals to be free from foreign state control. Not even the most strident
advocates for cosmopolitanism argue that no constraints exist. 185 This is
particularly true with public law litigation in the U.S., where civil litigation
serves important regulatory goals.
Limits on the broadest forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction is therefore
an essential bulwark to democratic self-governance and self-determination.
Exorbitant jurisdictional assertions are often viewed as unseemly meddling
in the affairs of another, and a vestige of colonial legal imperialism. 186 As
Michael Akehurst described in a related context:
A State is entitled to impose its ideology on its nationals and on all
persons present in its territory; it is also entitled to oblige both
categories of persons to take its side in its struggles against other
States. But it is not entitled to make such demands on aliens living
(2006) (setting out in Principle 2 and its comments, and Rule 4, that absent consent of the parties that
generally there must be "a substantial connection between the forum state and the party or the
transaction or occurrence in dispute" and that the "standard of 'substantial connection' has been
generally accepted for international disputes").
183. Admittedly normative rather than descriptive, no state is any more autonomous or legitimate
than any other state. U.N. Charter, art. 2, 1 (basing the United Nations on the "principle of the
sovereign equality" of all states).
184. This is what some have referred to as "the political conception of jurisdiction"-that
authority is "premised on some notion of membership to a political community." Adeno Addis,
Imagining the International Communi: The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Junscdon, 31 HUM. RTS. Q.
129, 134 (2009) (describing in the prescriptive jurisdiction context how "the regulated person or act
must be connected, however, thickly or thinly, to the political community we call the state."). Perhaps
the best-known articulation on the limitation of a state's right to exercise power over an individual or
dispute from a political theory perspective comes from Lea Brilmayer. See Lea Brilmayer, Juns-hional
Due Process and Politcal Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293 (1987); Lea Brilmayer, iUberalsm, Communi y and
State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991); see also LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL
MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD (1994).
185. For example, while rigorous debate exists as to whether universal jurisdiction exists in a
category of human rights cases, the general rule aside from those cases is that law can only "justifiably
coerce people when it emanates from some political association . . . ." Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan
Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025, 1049-53 (2005) (explaining theories beyond political conceptions of
power in universal jurisdiction cases).
186. See David H. Moore, United States Courts and Impenalism, 73 WASH & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
338 (2016). For a detailed discussion of exorbitant jurisdiction, see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B.
Palmer, Exorbitant uns-cdction, 58 MAINE L. REv. 474 (2006).
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in foreign countries. Any such attempt would be incompatible with
the political independence of the State of the aliens' nationality or
residence.187
Or more simply: The "suggestion that every individual is or may be subject
to the laws of every State at all times and in all places is intolerable."188
U.S. courts once clearly recognized and relied on these international law
limits. As described above, in early jurisdictional cases international legal
constraints were explicitly incorporated into domestic doctrine. 189
Therefore, in the landmark Pennoyer case, public international law provided
the basis for the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause.190 Even long
after International Shoe recast jurisdiction in terms of fairness and minimum
contacts, it was still widely understood that a state's territorial authority
limited adjudicatory jurisdiction. 191 And "[t]he doctrine of minimum
contacts originated in international law." 192
Leading commentators and scholars reached the same conclusion
consistently over a long period of time. In the Second Restatement,
adjudicatory jurisdiction, as a component of enforcement jurisdiction, was
187. Michael Akehurst, Junsdction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 159 (1973)
(questioning whether international law limits adjudicatory jurisdiction but describing limits on the
protective principle).
188. J.L. Brierly, The Lotus Case, 44 L. Q. REV. 154, 162 (1928).
189. See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennyer Vas I&g, 95 TEx. L. REV. 1249, 1273 (2017) ("And the law
of nations dd regulate jurisdiction over the parties. According to Marshall and Justice Story . . . a
judgment that exceeded international limits on personal jurisdiction would not be 'regarded by foreign
courts' as binding .... '). For famous cases see D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850);
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367-68 (1873); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
255 (1827); see also Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of PersonalJunscdtion, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 849, 872 & nn.116-20 (1989) (listing early cases approaching personal jurisdiction using
principles from the law of nations).
190. Patrickj. Borchers, Companng PersonalJunrschtion in the United States and the European Communiy:
LessonsforAmercan Reform, 40 AM.J. COMP. L. 121, 123 (1992) (explaining that "[e] arly on, the Supreme
Court considered jurisdictional precepts to be a matter of common law, deduced from international
law."); Transgrud, supranote 102, at 871-76 (discussing how the original federal common law rules of
jurisdiction were based on territorial rules derived from international law). That domestic Due Process
Clause limits were drawn from international law's limitations is well understood and recognized. Jay
Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With Jundsction< 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1104 (1994)
(noting that at the time, since it "seemed obvious to treat the United States as a collection of
interrelated but sovereign states," courts routinely turned to "the law of nations for appropriate
[jurisdictional] principles and rules"); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases ofJunsdiction, 22 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775, 796-808 (1955) (explaining that the American colonies inherited a long-standing tradition
from international law that recognized territorial borders as the key limitation on a sovereign's authority
and jurisdiction).
191. Reese, supra note 89 at 1589 (noting that due process "also serves as an instrument of
federalism (or presumably of internationalism in an international case) by preventing a state from
taking jurisdiction of a case when to do so would improperly impinge upon the interests of one or
more other states or would otherwise conflict with the needs of the interstate or international system").
192. Lilly, supra note 21, at 124.
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limited under international law to the same extent as prescriptive
jurisdiction.193 The Third Restatement-which sought to bend international
law's limits to more closely mirror developing U.S. fairness considerations
and incorporate interest balancing through a rule of reasonableness-was
clear that limits exist to prevent untrammeled national court authority.194
Writing in the mid-1980s, noted international lawyer Gary Born observed
that "[m]any authorities argue that today nations treat 'assertions of
jurisdiction that [are] considered extravagant as violations of international
law."' 195 The same sentiment was expressed later in the 1990s when
commentators argued over whether jurisdiction based on transient presence
violated international law.196 More recently, in 2006, the ALI and Unidroit
set out a "substantial connection" standard as being "generally accepted"
for personal jurisdiction in international cases. 197
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
20 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (permitting jurisdiction to enforce in a state's territory any rule of law that the
state has jurisdiction to prescribe under one of the established bases of jurisdiction, such as nationality
and territoriality); see also Stanley Metzger, The Restatement of the Foregn Relations Law of the United States:
Bases and Conflcts of Jurisdcion, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 11-12 (1966).
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Introductory Note U.S., supra note 55, intro. note (describing how the "exercise of jurisdiction by
courts of one state that affects interests of other states is now generally considered as coming within
the domain of customary international law and international agreement" and "set[ting] forth some
international rules and guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate in cases having
international implications"); 421(2) (listing circumstances where the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable, including principles of territoriality and nationality); see also 403 cmt. a ("The principle
that an exercise of jurisdiction ... is ... unlawful ifit is unreasonable is established in United State law,
and has emerged as a principle of international law as well.")
195. Born, supra note 58, at 18 (citations omitted).
196. After Burnham was decided, commentators questioned whether jurisdiction based on
transitory presence (tag jurisdiction) violated the jurisdictional limits of international law. Whether
Burnham did so was contested, but no one simply argued that international law was entirely silent on
adjudicatory jurisdiction. See, eg, Peter Hay, Transient Junsdtion, Esecialy over International Defendants:
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 (criticizing
based on international practice); Russell Weintraub, An Objective Basifor Reecting Tranient Judction,
22 RUTGERS L.J. 611, 615-16 (1991) (arguing that transient jurisdiction may violate international law);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 55, 421, cmt. e,
Reporter's Note 5 (1987) (noting that jurisdiction based on transient presence can violate international
law and that "[J]urisdiction based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of
the state, is not generally acceptable under international law.").
197. ALI/UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 18, at 104 (2006).
The same understanding of international law and its limit on personal jurisdiction was made in
connection with discussions on a treaty on enforcement of judgments. See Catherine Kessedjian, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, June 1997, Intenationa ]uns-diction andForevgn Jugments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Prelim. Doc. No. 7 (Apr. 1997), at 22-23, 65 (explaining how under public
international law "that there has to be some 'substantial' or 'significant' connection between the forum
and the case" for jurisdiction to exist).
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ii. Attempts to Remake International Law
Despite this history, some U.S. legal scholars have recently advanced a
different, radical approach. Most prominently, the American Law Institute's
Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law has adopted what
previously had been a minority position: that aside from sovereign
immunity, international law does not constrain personal jurisdiction. 198
Professors William Dodge and Scott Dodson-two well-respected scholars
in the areas of international law and civil procedure recently implied that
this minority position was doctrinal canon in a Michigan Law Review article.
For them, any concern about violating international law is "easily dismissed"
because customary international law imposes no limits outside the exception
of sovereign immunity.199 Professor Dodge, one of the co-reporters of the
Fourth Restatement, has been a particular strong advocate for this new,
controversial approach, advancing it in a number of contextsUU
While it may be true that international law constraints are rarely in play
given often stricter domestic statutory and constitutional constraints, and
U.S. courts only sporadically, at best, directly consider international
limitations,2 01 the assertion that international law has nothing to say about
exorbitant jurisdictional assertions is an odd one. No evidence is given in
the text or its notes to support the Fourth Restatement's position, nor is an
explanation given for why other approaches upon which the ALI placed its
198. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
Jurisdiction 302, intro. note (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) ("[w]ith the exception of
sovereign immunity, modem customary international law generally does not impose limits on
jurisdiction to adjudicate."). Before the Fourth Restatement, only a small number of scholars advanced
the idea that international law imposes no limits on personal jurisdiction. Seegenerally Mills, supra note
175, at 228-30 (citing and discussing scholarship advancing the above-mentioned conception of
personal jurisdiction limitations).
199. Dodge & Dodson, supra note 9, at 1234. The claim is an odd one in the context of this
article, and appears an unnecessary aside, because international law's limits support their thesis that
international and domestic defendants should be treated differently. International law supports a
national contacts approach.
200. William S. Dodge, Jun h'tion in the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 18 YB OF
PRIVATE INT'L L. 143, 147 (2017) (noting that customary international law imposes some constraints,
but only in connection with immunity doctrines); William S. Dodge, The Customary International Law of
Junsdhtion in the Fourth Restatement of Forein Relations Law, OPINIO JURIS, March 8, 2018, available at
http: //opiniojuris.org/ 2018 /03 8 /the-customary-intemati6onal-law of-jurisdicton-in-the-
restatement- fourth-of- foreign-relations -law/ (asserting that customary international law imposes "no
limitations on jurisdiction to adjudicate outside the area of immunity"); William S. Dodge, United States
v. Mirosoft. Wh the Governent Should Win the Statutory Inteiretation Argument, Just Security, Feb. 19,
2018, aalable at https://www.justsecurity.org/52681/united-states-v-microsoft-govemment-win-
statutory-interpretation- argument- 2/ (arguing that customary international law does not regulate
personal jurisdiction).
201. Although this is not always true. See, e.g, Kobel, 569 U.S. 108 at 131-32 (Breyer,J., concurring)
(indicating he would have "looked to established international jurisdictional norms to help determine
the statute's substantive reach .... ).
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imprimatur-set out in the Third Restatement and the Prin/les of
Transnational Ciil Procedure-were so mistaken in their fundamental
assumptions about international law (as with the Third Restatement) or as
to state practice (as with the Princiesj 202 Similarly, no explanation is
provided for how the understanding of international law-once relied on
by both courts and so many leading commentators-changed so
dramatically. "Although some international lawyers have questioned the
need for a separate category of 'adjudicative jurisdiction,' few if any would
maintain that adjudicative jurisdiction is unregulated in international law." 03
Indeed "the weight of authority agrees with the Third Restatement in
supporting the existence of some international law limits on national
assertions of personal jurisdiction." 2 04 And contrary to what the Fourth
Restatement implies, "there is little in practice or policy to support the idea
that an assertion of jurisdiction . . . in civil proceedings is anything other
than an exercise of state regulatory power," which is "restricted by public
international rules on jurisdiction. "2 05
That territorial borders and territorial sovereignty play a less prominent
role in many international law contexts than they once did doesn't change
this conclusion. Over the last several decades, international law moved
beyond the old Westphalian notion of near impermeable state sovereignty
as international law scholars attempted to universalize human rights.2 06 That
202. This is not to argue that the Third Restatement's reasonableness standard itself reflects
international law. See David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customau International
Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALEJ. INT'L L. 419, 423,
428-37 (1997) (noting "numerous commentators" who argue that the reasonableness requirement of
the Third Restatement did not reflect customary international law, but noting that there must be a
"genuine link" between the state and the regulated person or activity); Cecil J. Olmstead, Jundction, 14
YALE J. INT'L L. 468, 472 (1989) (disputes that the reasonableness requirement is a principle of
international law). While the nature of international law's limit is open to debate, there's widespread
agreement that some limits exist.
203. Mills, supra note 175 at 195; see also Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law. The Neglected Role
of the International Law of Personal Junsction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 375, n.9 (1995)
("While the content of international jurisdictional law is perhaps unclear, most authorities agree that
this category of international law exists.").
204. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 101 (5th ed. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE U.S., supra note 55, 421, reporters' note 1. ("The modern concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate
under international law are similar to those developed under the due process clause of the United
States Constitution" and "[t]he exercise of jurisdiction by courts of one state that affects interests of
other states is now generally considered as coming within the domain of customary international law
and international agreement.").
205. Mills, supra note 175, at 201.
206. See W. Michael Reisman, E&tonal Comment, Sovereignp and Human RIghts in Contemporagy
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 872 (1990) (describing how human rights "shift[ed] the
fulcrum of the system from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people"); Anne Peters,
Humani as theA and Omega of Sovereignp, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 513 (2009) (arguing that sovereignty
is being ousted as the first principle of international law and that territorial sovereignty is not "merely
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
innovation, however, sought for the rule of law to further constrain state
power, not enlarge it. The aim was to prevent nations from using territorial
sovereignty as a shield when human rights abuses of its own citizens were
involved. Yet while it refocused its attention on the individual as a subject
of primary concern, international law did not relinquish its constraint on
state power vis- l-vis other states.2 07 If anything, international law began to
recognize even more sharply the right of states and their citizenry-within
the confines of human rights norms-to develop and be free from foreign
oversight.2 08 International law therefore has sought to protect democratic
independence by constraining unbridled national power and by checking
powerful nations from imposing their worldviews. As a result, structurally it
remains the preference that transnational and global challenges usually be
resolved through consensual bilateral and multilateral engagement-finding
mutually acceptable solutions to shared challenges-not the exercise of
unilateral, hegemonic prerogative.
Those suggesting that international law's adjudicatory jurisdictional
limits have disappeared altogether must explain how and why international
law sought to expand state power over foreign individuals without
constraint. Extraterritorial power, where one state unilaterally asserts power
over foreign citizens, particularly when doing so interferes with the laws and
policies of another state, is usually the sort of empire building project and
offense to popular sovereignty that modern international law was intended
to forestall. 209 Said differently, the principles of sovereign equality and
respect for human rights rejects the idea of unconstrained state power over
foreigners, so the burden is on those who believe states can adjudicate the
rights of citizens of other states without limit, to demonstrate how such a
view is compatible with fundamental principles of our modern international
system.21 0 This is particularly true where in other areas-for example, choice
of law, legislative jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction2 11- limits exist
even as territoriality has played a more limited role. No principled reason
exists for why public international law would impose limits on state
limited by humanl rights, but should be seen to exist only in function of humanity"); RUTi TEITEL,
HUMANITY'S LAW (2011).
207. Seegenerally Helen Stacy, Relational Soverrino, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2003) (describing how
sovereignty demarcates state power).
208. JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (2012).
209. Krisch, More Equaln the Res, supra note 26.
210. Jean L. Cohen, WhoseSotereignff? Empire Versus Inte1 a ?ional Law, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS
17 (2004).
211. Fourth Restatement (see comment note) (% 407-13 for legislative jurisdiction /prescriptive;
and 432 for enforcement)
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executive and legislative power212 but grant the judicial branch unbridled
authority in the civil context.2 13
Two arguments are usually proffered for why international law no
longer imposes any constraint on state power, at least when exercised by the
judiciary in civil litigation. The first is that states from time to time have
ignored the structural limitations of the international legal system.2 14 But
evidence of state noncompliance is insufficient. Contrary state practice is as
much evidence of unlawful activity as it is of the nonexistence of a
customary norm.2 15 Evidence that some states ignore international law's
limits from time to time, or disagree as to whether all exorbitant assertions
are violations of international law, show at most that the limits of
international law and its contours are contested. It does not establish that
no limits exist. Or said differently, just because some exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction may not violate international law, does not mean that all
exorbitant bases are lawful. More fundamentally, if the foundational
structural limits of the international system no longer exist-as the Fourth
Restatement implies-then some explanation must be offered for why
fundamental principles of national sovereignty and the long-established
public law limits on state power suddenly disappeared.2 16
A more fundamental problem exacerbates the Fourth's Restatement's
mistake. Accepting the Fourth Restatement's approach would turn modern
jurisdictional analysis on its head because it assumes that adjudicatory
jurisdiction "is plenary and discretionary," absent a prohibitive rule.217 But
212. McLachlan, supra note 174, at 140 ("A claim to personal jurisdiction is still, one one level,
an exercise of state power.").
213. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (6th ed. 2003) (noting
no reason exists in principle to distinguish between jurisdictional limits in civil and criminal cases);
McLachlan, supra note 174, at 128 ("In classical public international law theory, there is no material
distinction between the exercise of civil jurisdiction and the exercise ofany other type of jurisdiction.").
214. William S. Dodge, The Customau International Law of Jursdction in the Restatement (Fourth) of
Foreign Relations Law, OPINIO JURIS, (Aug. 3, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/08/ the-
cus tomary-intemational-law-o f-juris diction -in-the-re statement- fourth- of- foreign-relations -law/ ("An
honest look at state practice and opiniojunrs today reveals no limitations on jurisdiction to adjudicate
outside the area of immunity.").
215. See, e.g, 2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 ICJ 14, 98, para. 186 (June 27) (noting that state practice need not "have been perfect"
and that "instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated
as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule") (https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pd). For an argument that occasional
breaches do not nullify customary international rules, particularly those with strong moral imperatives,
see Anthea E. Roberts, Trackional and Modern Approaches to Customa International Law: A Reconciliation
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 789-90 (2001).
216. As Gary Born and Bo Rutledge underscore, "When long-established jurisdictional limits
rests on fundamental principles of national sovereignty, is detailed evidence of state practice
necessary?" BORN & RUTLEDGE, sopranote 34, at 101.
217. Mills, supra note 175, at 192-93 (describing the rules of international jurisdiction and
explaining how the outdated position that "[t]he starting point is that jurisdiction, like sovereignty
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established practice requires instead affirmative evidence of a permissive
rule for universal civil jurisdiction.218 One cannot reach the Restatement's
position by pointing to the absence of state practice limiting jurisdiction as
the Reporters have done.2 19 Instead, one needs affirmative evidence of
consistent state practice and opinio ju k to show the traditional bases of
personal jurisdiction (e.g., territoriality and nationality) no longer apply in
the civil context. No such consistent state practice exists. And with the
exception of possibly universal civil jurisdiction arising from a small subset
of egregious international crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and torture), states have not accepted universal, civil, adjudicatory
authority.220
The second is to argue that states can resist exorbitant jurisdictional
assertions at the judgment enforcement stage.221 But this no-harm-no-foul
rejoinder lacks force, too. The violation of international law at the beginning
of the lawsuit is not remedied through defensive maneuvering at the
enforcement stage. Even if a lawsuit is ultimately unenforceable, the costs
itself, is plenary and discretionary" has been rejected if it was "ever tenable-and there is good reason
to doubt it ever was....'); ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 17 (9th ed. 1992) (freedom [ofa state to act] is derived from a legal right and not from an assertion
of unlimited will, and is subject to international law). Even the Lotus case, whose dicta has been at
times cited for an everything-is-permitted-if-not-prohibited principle, itself recognized that a state
"should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction." SS 'Lotus' (Fr. v
Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). See also Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae
in Support of Neither Party at 11, Keobelv. RoyalDutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491),
available at https: //www.americanbar.org/ content/ dam/ aba/pubicati6ons /supreme-court-preview/
briefs/ 10- 1491-neutralamcunetherlands-uk-greatbritain-andirelandg9ovs.authcheckdam.pdf ("[I]t is
now widely accepted that an internationally recognized principle must be identified before a State can
exercise extraterritorial civil jurisdiction") (citations omitted).
218. Alex Mills, Prvate Interests and Prvate Law Regulation in Public International Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, ffi. 28 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019)
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, n.28); see also CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 32-34 (2015) (noting the approach that "has
been taken by most States and the majority of the doctrine" and has "crystallized" as "a consensus
opinion" requires that "States justify their jurisdictional assertion in terms of a permissive international
law rule.").
219. See, eg., William S. Dodge, The Customary Internationa/ Law of Juiiction in the Fourt) Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law, OPINIO JURIS, (Mar. 8, 2018), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/08/the-customary-intemati6onal-law-of-jurisdicti6on-inthe-
restatement- fourth-of- foreign-relations -law/ (arguing based on the absence of a prohibitive rule);
William S. Dodge, Anthea Roberts, and Paul Stephan, Juisiction to Adjudcate Under Customary
International Law, OPINIO JURIS, (Sept. 11, 2018), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2018/09/11/33646/ (arguing based on the absence of a prohibitive rule).
220. Mills, supra note 175, at 199 ("These different aspects of public international law on
jurisdiction... all recognise that jurisdiction is limited by positive grounds, and thus an act of regulation
must be justifiable based on a positive rule conferring jurisdiction.").
221. See McLachlan, supra note 174, at 140 (noting that "[t]he exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
sheds little light on appropriate bases for original jurisdiction" and rejecting the idea that the only limit
on a state's personal jurisdiction to adjudicate is at the execution of a judgment).
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of litigation and the potential for enforcement forces companies and
individuals to account for foreign regulations. This is particularly so because
judgment enforcement laws can be hard to predict.222 And, in any case,
lawsuits can play important symbolic roles separate and apart from any
ability to collect on a judgment." 3 It would also effectively ostracize a
defendant and the defendant's property from the foreign country, so long
as the judgment remained standing.224 Also this deterrent-based solution-
discouraging litigants from filing because they may not later obtain relief-
doesn't constrain unlawful state action, avoid friction with foreign nations,
or remedy the burden on defendants having to defend in place where the
defendant may have no connection. 225 Of course, in the domestic context,
the idea that a defendant can sufficiently protect itself from exorbitant
jurisdictional assertions through the defendant's home state declining to
enforce a judgment was long ago rejected as inadequate.226
Finding that international law imposes no limits on judicial adjudicatory
power would also lead to a particularly absurd result. U.S. states, when
ratifying the Constitution, relinquished some degree of sovereignty as part
of the formation of the federal system, but maintained a measure of
sovereignty, too.227 As described in Part III, much of the debate around
federalism and personal jurisdiction is how much or to what extent, if any,
the rights of states as once-independent nations were incorporated into the
Due Process Clause (the premise being the more that states retain
characteristics of foreign nations, the greater restrictions on personal
jurisdiction remain)." 8 The Fourth Restatement, however, concludes that
222. S.I. Strong, Recognition andE forcement ofForena Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities,
33 REv. LITIG. 45, 85 (2014) ("[T]he law regarding enforcement and recognition of judgments in the
United States is extremely convoluted. As a result, it is nearly impossible for litigants to anticipate
either the procedural or substantive principles that will govern in any particular case.")
223. Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualinug Complicio in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64
n.il (2008) ("ATS judgments against individual defendants provide invaluable symbolic vindication.");
see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaint ifs Diplomag', FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at
102, 106 (noting that one of the principal benefits of human rights litigation may be the "public
attention they generate").
224. Rutherglen, supra note 8, at 8, n. 32 (making this point).
225. See Montre D. Carodine, PoficalJudging. When Due Process Goes International, 48 W. & M. L.
REV. 1159 (2007) (describing the vagaries of foreign judgment enforcement).
226. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2) (permitting preanswer motion for lack of personal jurisdiction);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2018) (explaining how due process protects against
inconvenient and distant litigation and serves as a territorial limit on state power).
227. At independence, U.S. states claimed the same rights and position as foreign nations. THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (claiming all rights of "free and independent
states"); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.').
228. For an explanation of how the Framers "understood the States as sovereign entities bound
together in an interdependent coexistence very much like the community of nations, and they therefore
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
the inherent sovereignty of foreign nations includes no limits on personal
jurisdiction. Accepting this would thereby flip the entire premise, rendering
the great debates of federalism in the personal jurisdiction context
meaningless. Why debate what remains of independent nation sovereignty
for personal jurisdiction purposes if none existed to begin with?zz 9
If accepted, it also means that, for the first time, U.S. domestic law
would be fully divorced from its international counterpart. In early cases,
U.S. domestic law mirrored international law principles. The Third
Restatement also tried to create a general parity between emerging U.S.
domestic jurisdictional law (and its emphasis in the 1980s on fairness) and
international law by focusing on a reasonableness requirement. Only now
would there exist a time when domestic law imposes limits, and international
law imposes none. It would also make longstanding debates in international
law-such as the precise scope of universal civil jurisdiction-somewhat
nonsensical. Why debate for which international crimes and under what
circumstances a state can claim universal jurisdiction over an accused in a
civil case, if no limitation exists under any circumstances regardless of
whether a universal norm is implicated?2 30
Acknowledging international law's existence, even if its constraints are
not often implicated and its contours ill-defined, is important. The tendency
to downplay or devalue international law in the U.S. often seems part of a
frequently consulted international law and political theory to craft rules conducive to a peaceful and
mutually respectful coexistence" see Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International
Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1031, 1032-41 (2002) (showing "how the founding
generation borrowed from the law of nations to address issues of constitutional federalism"); see also
Peter J. Smith, States as Nations Dinipy in Cross-Doctrinal Perspeclive, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003).
229. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Juisa-ction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 264-65 (2014) (arguing that the Court's personal
jurisdiction "framework must give due regard to the state's regulatory and adjudicatory interests"); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Jus-ction to Adjudicate: A RetisedAnaysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 620 (2006)
(stating that state sovereignty is one factor "central to determining adjudicatory jurisdiction"); Allan R.
Stein, Soles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jushction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689,
689-90 (1987) (arguing that "assertions of jurisdiction ... ought to reflect the general limits on state
sovereignty inherent in a federal system" and that interstate federalism plays a "central and unavoidable
role" in jurisdictional decisions); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jus-ction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 85 (1980) ("[1]t is possible to make purely structural arguments in
defense of sovereignty limitations which would be persuasive even if the Due Process Clause did not
exist.").
230. Seven D. Roper, Applying Universal Juri-cction to Civil Cases: Variations in State Approaches to
Moneting Human ghts Violations, 24 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 103 (2018); see also Addis, Imagining the
International Communi, supra note 184, at 133-36. See also Meno T. Kamminga, Universal Cit ilusction:
Is it Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99 AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L. 123, 124-25 (2005) ("No rule of international law
specifically authorizes let alone obliges the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction" in human rights
cases, but argues it should exist for injuries arising from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and torture).
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larger effort to discredit it.231 This strategy is also a particularly short-sighted.
U.S. constitutional limits already constrain our courts, and increasingly so.
The risk then is that we promote an international legal order where other
countries can claim unchecked judicial power, even when our own power is
more tightly constrained. The dramatic growth of transnational litigation
outside the U.S. makes this risk more poignant.2 32 The demeaning of
international law in this way should also worry those committed to
developing an effective international legal system. Ignoring international
law's limits on personal jurisdiction pushes power to judges in other
countries, and risks creating a pluralistic free-for-all.
B. Differently Situated
Aside from international law's limits, cases involving non-resident
foreign defendants are different in other ways. 233 Appreciating these
differences amplifies why personal jurisdiction implicates different
considerations in the context of transnational litigation.2 34
i. The I mits of Due Process
The first difference, which the Court has never directly addressed, is the
application of due process standards to foreign defendants. It remains
unclear whether the Due Process Clause should apply to foreign defendants
231. JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); see e.g, JACK
GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (setting forth a skeptical
account of international law).
232. See, e.g, R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric S. Sibbitt, The Globalization of Amencan Law, 58 INT'L
ORG. 103, 103 (2004) (describing the spread of U.S.-style of litigation in other countries).
233. This Article is not focused on litigation where foreign plaintiffs bring suit against U.S.
defendants. For a number of reasons, U.S. courts appear to be progressively preventing litigation
brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. corporations. That trend may well be problematic. Litigation
that seeks to hold U.S. defendants liable at home in compliance with U.S. law does not raise the
international and personal jurisdiction issues that tralsnational lawsuits against nonresident, foreign
defendants do. For an analysis, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnationalbtigation andInstitutional
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010).
234. The U.S. system has long been criticized for being too focused on the domestic. See, e.g,
Dubinsky, supra note 32, at 306 ("When American courts are confronted with disputes with a
transnational dimension, they reach for a familiar toolbox-one with tools for fixing domestic
problems. They extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic litigation, especially interstate
litigation."); cf. Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in Amencan Conflicts Law, 49 AM J. COMP. L. 369, 388
(2001) ("[M]ainstream American conflicts law continues to focus too much on purely domestic issues
and to treat international problems as an exotic sideshow."); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and Ilnternational
Distinctions in Conflict ofLaws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1599-1600 (1966) ("To apply
mechanically a rule developed in interstate cases to an international situation without a consideration
of its policy relevance is both wrong and dangerous.").
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in the same way as it applies to domestic defendants. In an earlier article,2 35
I explained why providing foreign defendants the same due process rights
as domestic defendants is conceptually paradoxical, given the Court's
approach to constitutional rights in other contexts.2 36 A second related and
unresolved question is whether the Fifth Amendment offers foreign
defendants identical protections in federal courts as the Fourteenth
Amendment does in interstate cases. 2 37
A number of courts and commentators have noted the disconnect
described above and questioned whether a different jurisdictional analysis
should apply to foreign, non-resident defendants. Most recently, Professor
Robin Effron described the "nonresident alien due process paradox."2 38
Professor Lea Brilmayer and Professor John Drobak in separate articles
made similar observations following the Court's decisions in Nicastro and
Goodyear. 239 So too have other commentators 240 and courts. 241 Another
235. Parrish, Sovereignt, supra note 10, at 28- 38; see also Paul R. Dubinsky, Challenging theAssumption
ofjEquaio: The Due Process Rzghts for Forein ztiagants in U.S. Courts, 5 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'L L. 2 (2007)
(panel discussion of the due process of rights of aliens). For an earlier argument along similar lines, see
Gary A. Haugen, Personal Junsaction and Due Process Rzghtsfor Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 109
(1993).
236. See, eg., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990);Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
237. Civi Procedure- Personal Junsaction - D. C. Circuit Dismisses SuitAgainst National PortAuthody
of Lebenafor Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. - GSS Group Ltd. V. National Port Authodo, 680F.3d8O5 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1695 (2013); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and "PuIposeful
Avaumenil '.t A Reassessment ofFifith Amendmentbnmits on Personal Juscdiztion, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 455, 456
(2004).
238. Effron, supranote 9, at 123 ("[T]he constitutional right to resist personal jurisdiction enjoyed
by the nonresident alien defendant in a civil lawsuit is remarkably out of alignment with that same
nonresident alien's ability to assert nearly every other constitutional right.").
239. Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of PersonalJuris-iction: Issues Left Open
b Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown andJ. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C L. REV. 617, 633
(2012) ("[T]he idea that foreign nationals acting i foreign countries can claim U.S. constitutional rights
is both highly controversial and contrary to other Supreme Court precedent."); John N. Drobak,
Personal Juisdiction in a Global World A Comment on the Supreme Court's Recent Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1707-08 (2013) (arguing "that non-resident, non-citizens
defendants are not protected by the constitutional personal jurisdiction law developed in domestic
litigation").
240. Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 847 (2013) ("the
extension of due process rights to aliens abroad in the civil procedure context stands in contrast with
the treatment of [other constitutional rights] .. .where courts have extended fewer protections to
aliens, especially those outside U.S. borders."); Colin Miller, Complete Disconnect: Does ItMake Sense To
Apply A Due Process-Based Personal Junsction Test toAliens, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL COURTS
BLOG, April 11, 2011, aailable athttp://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2011/04/i-recently-read-
a-couple-o f-intere s ting-opinions -and- a-juxtapo sition-o f- the-two -raises -a-thought-provoking-
question-one-add.html (describing inconsistent treatment); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 34
(describing the issue and potential inconsistent treatment); cf., e.g, Michael Farbiarz, Accuraj and
Adjudica 'on: The Promise of 1Extraterritora/ Due Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (2016) (arguing that if
due process limits personal jurisdiction in civil cases, it must also place curbs on extraterritorial criminal
prosecutions).
241. GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139 (D.D.C. 2011) ("It is not
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group of scholars have advocated for a national contacts approach under
the Fifth Amendment.2 42
Two things should be emphasized. First, suggesting that the Due
Process Clause may apply differently to non-resident alien defendants is not
to argue that foreign defendants should be unable to contest exorbitant
jurisdiction. Rather, it is to underscore that finding foreign corporations
have greater protections in the civil context than individual defendants have
in a host of other contexts is paradoxical. Indeed, it could well be that due
process rights should be expanded in other contexts to mirror the Due
Process Clause's applicability to foreign defendants in civil litigation.2 43
Second, and related, examining the Due Process Clause's scope as to non-
resident foreign defendants is not to suggest that personal jurisdiction
should be unregulated. On the contrary, as described above, public
international law provides some modest limits and a multilateral convention
on jurisdiction and judgments may become essential.2 44
ii. Structural Differences
The applicability of the Due Process Clause is not the only difference.
For the domestic, interstate context, a number of federal constitutional
provisions-from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, to the Privileges and Immunities Clause-protect the
structure of the federal system.245 The "absence of readily identifiable
clear why foreign defendants, other than foreign sovereigns, should be able to avoid the jurisdiction
of United States courts by invoking the Due Process Clause when it is established in other contexts
that nonresident aliens without connections to the United States typically do not have rights under the
United States Constitution.").
242. Dodge & Dodson, supra note 9; See, e.g, Jonathan R. Nash, National Personal Junshction,
(Emory Legal Stud. Res. Paper, Feb. 6, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?
abstract id= 3119383; Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Junschion, 108 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1301 (2014) (suggesting a system of nationwide federal personal jurisdiction). For an earlier
approach, see Degnan & Kane, supra note 21, at 816-17.
243. See, e.g, Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 909, 981-90 (1991) (arguing
that the government should "afford constitutional rights whenever it asserts legal obligation against
any human being"); cf. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957-59 (2002) (describing the
constitutional double standard in treatment of citizens and noncitizens, particularly post-September
11,2001).
244. See general" Linda Silberman, Compa ti eJunsction in the International Context. Will the Proposed
Ha gueJudgments Contenton be Saved? 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002).
245. For a strong territorial position, see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens ofEqual and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992).
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international constitutional protections" make the transnational context
different.246
The stakes are different as a result of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 47
In domestic cases, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires not only that
states enforce sister-state judgments where personal jurisdiction exists, but
also that states open their courthouse doors under sister-state laws.248 The
Privileges and Immunities Clause reinforces judgments in similar ways. U.S.
courts traditionally have been more liberal in foreign judgment recognition.
These differences play out in different ways.
Foreign relations can also be implicated in transnational cases in a way
they are not in domestic interstate ones. 249 As Gary Born has explained, the
appearance of an exorbitant jurisdictional assertion "can readily arouse
foreign resentment," .provoke diplomatic protests," "trigger commercial or
judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields."2 5 0
Similarly, "in a globalized economy[,] differences between domestic rules
governing jurisdictional issues and the recognition of foreign judgments may
hamper the functioning of international trade and commerce."2 51 While
foreign relations concerns don't arise in many garden-variety claims, they
are more likely to arise if domestic courts interpret their jurisdictional
reaches broadly.
iii. Different Burdens and Access
These structural differences lead to other challenges. The burdens faced
by foreign defendants in transnational cases are different than those faced
by domestic defendants, and usually are more significant. Foreign
246. Harold G. Maier, Extraterntona/ Jun -sction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Pvate Internationa/Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 289 (1982).
247. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 1.
248. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).
249. Born, supra note 58, at 28 (Jurisdictional assertions over foreign defendants with little
connections to the nation "can affect United States foreign relations in ways that domestic claims of
jurisdiction cannot"); see alsoAsahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987)
(noting that the assertion of jurisdiction in California over aJapanese corporation might strain foreign
relations).
250. Born, supra note 58, at 28-29; see also Bassett, Implied "Consent," supra note 43, at 634
("[A]mong the practical reasons commanding a closer evaluation of the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over foreign claimants is the potential impact on foreign relations."); LEA BRILMAYER, AN
INTRODUCTION TOJURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 289 (1986) ("The resolution
of [international cases] is a particularly delicate matter because the confrontation between laws and
policies of the United States and foreign states are often sharper and more complex than any analogous
showdown between two states. Simply put, overly aggressive adjudication can disrupt commerce and
peace between nations much more than it can between States.").
251. Willibald Posch, Reso/in g Business Diutes Through tiiigation or OtherA/ternaties The Effects of
Jun-sactional Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 HOuS.J. INT'L L. 363, 363-64 (2004). For a more detailed
discussion, see Parrish, So ereign, supra note 10, at 47-50.
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procedures can be difficult to maneuver and substantive law can be
different,25 2 which may make foreign litigants "more subject to procedural
default or tactical errors."2 5 3 A number of other factors also exist that are
not present in interstate case, "including familiarity with the legal system,
linguistic capacity, and especially the ability to retain local counsel."'5 4
Nonresident, alien defendants also find the U.S. right to jury trials and
contingency fees unfamiliar and hard to navigate.255 Alien defendants also
often characterize U.S. discovery procedures as free-wheeling "fishing
expeditions" compared to their home country procedures, and international
lawsuits from a foreign perspective "are expensive, difficult to investigate
and defend, and legally complex." 256 At the very least, they "present
different issues of litigation planning and forum choice" and choice of law
issues take on heightened importance.257 The concerns may be especially
acute in particular kinds of cases.258
The concerns are not limited to the U.S. When fashioning personal
jurisdiction, the Court must be wary of the standard it sets as U.S. litigants
will later have difficulty complaining about foreign judicial systems that
follow U.S. jurisdictional rules. But generally U.S. parties worry about
252. For recent discussion of the burdens faced by foreigners in U.S. courts, see Katherine Florey,
supra note 13, at 1234-35 ("[F]oreign defendants are burdened more than domestic ones, not only
because of the universal problems of travel and unfamiliarity with the legal system ... but also because
aspects of the U.S. legal system are significantly at odds with norms in most other countries.");
Robertson, TransnationalLitigation, supranote 233, at 1085 (describing different aspects ofthe U.S. legal
system compared to others).
253. Florey, supra note 13, at 1236.
254. Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 9, at 419, nn.50-52 (citations omitted); see also Dubinsky,
TransnationalbUtigation, supra note 32, 325-27 (describing unique burdens and cultural differences).
255. Linda Silberman, Comp arati-e unscction, supra note 244, at 320 (noting that complaints about
U.S. civil litigation include complaints about "juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often
substantive American law, which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under similar pro-plaintiff
choice of law rules"); see also Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a
Worldwide Convention on International Juns-ction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A
GLOBAL LAW OFJURISDICTION ANDJUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 267 (John J. Barcelo
& Kevin M. Clermont eds. 2002) (explaining that "United States judgments are feared in the rest of
the world" and that there exists "genuine concern over the assertion of jurisdiction by United States
courts because of the size of the awards that juries in the United States are believed to grant in civil
litigation").
256. Trek C. Doyle & Roberto Calvo Ponton, The Renaissance of the Foreign Action and a Practice
Response, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 293, 295 (2002).
257. Childress, Rethinking Legal Globalization, supra note 9, at 1518-20, 1543-48.
258. See Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497 (2003)
(describing perceived foreign bias in patent cases); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Iatzon Across the
Atlantic and the Future ofAmercan Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (describinghow the U.S.
system can be viewed as exceptional because of "class actions, primarily on an opt-out basis;
contingency-fee financing of litigation; rejection of Euro-style 'loser-pays' rules that link responsibility
for the fees of both sides to the outcome of the litigation; extensive reliance on juries as fact-finders;
costly pre-trial discovery; and the availability of punitive damages in substantial areas of civil
litigation").
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foreign litigation as much as foreigners do, often believing foreign courts to
be biased or corrupt. 259 "Differences across nations in the quality of courts
are profound .... Lack of judicial independence, corrupt and biased judges,
long delays, and highly formalistic procedures are among the judicial
shortcomings that commentators frequently identify.O 60 In recent years,
there has been some high-profile transnational cases outside the U.S.261 and
foreign forums may be more pro-plaintiff than they once were.2 62
Courts have often recognized the burdens in litigating in a foreign
forum. 263 In Asahi, the Supreme Court recognized that the burden of
mounting a defense in a foreign legal system can be "unique" and should be
afforded "significant weight" in assessing the reasonableness of extending
jurisdiction "over national borders."2 64 As a result, "[g]reat care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction
into the international field."2 65 More recently, some on the Court have
suggested it would be fundamentally unfair to require "a small Egyptian shirt
maker, or a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee
farmer" to defend far from home.2 66 Access concerns may also arise in the
transnational context, which don't arise domestically. In an interstate case,
dismissal likely means the plaintiff will refile in a different state. The same
may not be true in international cases.2 67
259. Maya Steinitz & Paul Gowder, Transnaionalbitigaion as a Prsoner'sDilemma, 94 N.C. L. REV.
751, 752 (2016) (noting the "perceptions of widespread corruption in the judicial processes in maly,
usually low- income, countries" and calling for an international court of civil justice); ERIC POSNER,
THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 228 (2009) (noting that "American legalism does not extend very
far from its shores" and that Americans do not support decisions unless made by "American courts,
which are staffed by Americans who share American values and interests").
260. Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 38, at 7.
261. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 40, at 1447-49 (describing the Chevron-Ecuador
litigation); see also R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of Amercan Law, 58 INT'L ORG.
103, 103 (2004) (explaining how "American legal style is spreading to other jurisdictions"); supra note
38.
262. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 40, at 1449, n. 21 (noting how foreign systems have begun
"favoring qualities of the U.S. legal system," and "appear more likely to grant relief to plaintiffs and to
do so in larger amounts than they previously were"); see also Shill, supra note 36, at 462 ("Plaintiffs now
routinely litigate the merits phase of such disputes in foreign forums, where they benefit from newly
favorable substantive law and sometimes from a politicized or corrupt judiciary, and then come to
American courts to collect on their judgments, where they enjoy a tradition of hospitality to foreign
judgments.").
263. Florey, supra note 13, at 1235 ("[T]he Court's recent jurisprudence is full of references to the
hardships of foreign defendants.").
264. Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 103-04, 112 (1987).
265. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
266. Nwcastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
267. Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnarional and Comparative
Perpective, 63 S. C. L. REV. 591, 595-96 (2012) ("[T]here is a concern that the plaintiff, if he cannot sue
the foreign defendant in the United States, may not be able to sue at all.").
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A final concern focuses on fairness and the perception of bias. As
Maggie Gardner describes, commentators "worry that the courts are
ignoring foreign sovereign interests in the cases they do take, whether by
compelling broad extraterritorial discovery, declining to apply foreign or
international law, or attempting to block foreign proceedings." 26 8 The
procedures themselves may lead to parochial outcomes, favoring U.S.
litigants over foreign ones. 269 At the very least, U.S. courts apply U.S. choice
of law rules and decide cases with U.S. judges and juries, which is often
interpreted as necessarily promoting U.S. interests.270 Foreign defendants
generally believe U.S. courts favor U.S. litigants. 271 Indeed, while not
necessarily empirically correct,27 2 "perceptions that American courts are
hostile to foreign parties are widespread." 27 3 Related to this perception of
bias are the very issues of self-determination that modern notions of
sovereignty seek to protect. As Heather Gerken describes in the domestic
context: "It's unsettling, after all, when one state's policies stretch beyond
268. Gardner, supra note 15, at 944 (citing sources).
269. Id; cf. Silberman, supranote 267, at 596 ("More generally, domestic institutions and attitudes
within a particular country can differ markedly from those in foreign states, increasing the litigation
burden of the foreign defendant.").
270. Christopher L. Doerksen, The Restatement of Canada's Cuban (American) Problem, 61
SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 127, 134 (1998) ("Canada believes that a judge raised with the cultural
construct of the United States will necessarily tend to favor U.S. interests .... '); Willibald Posch,
Resolvinag Business Disputes Through Ltigation or Other Alternatives. The Effects of Jursa-ctional Rules and
Recognition Practice, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 363, 374 (2004) ("For Europeans, it is common belief that
members of a U.S. jury, even if carefully selected, will usually be inclined to sympathize with the U.S.
plaintiffs rather than the foreign defendants."). Statements by some judges, speaking even in the
interstate context, aid fuel to this appearance. Richard Neely, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How
BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988) (a West Virginia
Supreme Court justice noting that "[a]s long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state
companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when
I give someone else's money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families
and their friends will re-elect me."). This is not a new fear. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1121 (1996) ("As James Madison said of state
courts: 'We well know, sir, that foreigners c oannt get justice done them in these courts .... ") (citations
omitted).
271. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia orXenophobia in U.S. Courts?Before and
After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 452 (2007) (noting the perception of bias, but
concluding that the data offer no support for the existence of xenophobic bias in U.S. courts); see also
Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, supra note 270, at 1121-22, 1143 (1996)
(concluding empirically that foreigners do not fare badly in U.S. courts); Kevin R. Johnson, Why
Alieage ur-ction? Histodcal Foundaions andModern ]usticationsforFederalJurisdirtion over Dutes Involving
Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22-25 (1996) (describing fear and perception of bias against
foreigners).
272. Christopher A. Whytock, Myth orMess? Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 732-
34 (2009) (finding perception of bias against foreigners not empirically true).
273. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in Amercan Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1497 (2003).
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its territories. It's unsettling for the simplest of reasons: no one wants to live
under someone else's law."274
V. CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction remains a critically important area for those interested
in the developing field of transnational law. This Article has sought to inform
the discussion by making three principal contributions. First, it describes how
personal jurisdiction over foreign, nonresident defendants remains an
important and timely issue and emphasizes how an interplay exists between
domestic jurisdictional doctrines and international lawmaking. Broad
conceptions of unilateral, extraterritorial regulation-where courts assert
jurisdiction over claims against foreign, nonresident defendants for foreign
harms-risks undermining broader multilateral engagement. Second, the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decisions involving personal jurisdiction should be
understood within, and partly limited to, their international contexts. Civil
disputes involving foreign, nonresident defendants raise different
considerations-both practical and conceptual-than domestic disputes. The
tendency for courts and commentators to conflate and treat international
disputes as variations of domestic disputes continues to be problematic,
particularly because sovereignty considerations play a different and more
significant role in international cases. Lower courts should be careful to not
overstate the applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent decisions to
the purely domestic, interstate context. Third, public international law imposes
restraints on personal jurisdiction. The newly adopted Fourth Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is simply incorrect when it
suggests that personal jurisdiction is unregulated under international law. The
weight of authority is against that minority position, which would overturn
settled practice. Courts and commentators must be careful to not
unintentionally rely on the Fourth Restatement's controversial approach.
274. Heather Gerken, The Taft Lecture: itving Under Someone Else's Law, 84 U. CIN. L. REv. 377,
378 (2016) (emphasis in original) (noting this sentiment and arguing against this powerful intuition in
the horizontal federalism context); see also Stephen Sachs, Why Not Bill Gates, or the Pope? in SCOTUS
OT16 Symposium: Jurisdiction and Power in Bristol-Meyers Squibb, PRAWFSBLAWG, (June 19, 2017),
available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/scotus-ot16-symposium-
jurisdiction-and-power-in-bristol-meyers-squibb.html ("Let's grant that California can determine
whether those California sales were lawful. But where do its officials get power to make the same
decision about the Kansas ones? Who put them in charge? Why should BMS have to obey the
pronouncements of a California judge, appointed by California officials and retained by California
voters, using California rules on procedure, discovery, evidence, or jury trial? Maybe what BMS did in
Kansas was okay, maybe not. But why do Californians get to decide?").
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